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PROTECTION BY LAW, REPRESSION BY LAW:
BRINGING LABOR BACK INTO THE STUDY OF LAW AND
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
Catherine L. Fisk
Diana S. Reddy*
ABSTRACT
Within the rich, interdisciplinary literature on law and social movements,
scholarly attention has often focused on how the civil rights movement, and
other movements that share a resemblance to it, have mobilized law; less
attention has been paid to the labor movement’s experience of being regulated
by law. In this Article, we ask how refocusing on the experiences of labor unions
regulated by law complicates understandings of how movements shape law, and
law shapes movements, in turn.
To explore the relationship between labor and law at a critical historical
juncture, we delve into the largely unexplored legal history of the first major
damages judgment against a labor union under the Taft-Hartley amendments to
the National Labor Relations Act. Decided as the New Deal era gave way to the
“rights revolution” of the 1950s and 1960s, this case dramatizes the costs of the
labor movement’s distinct regulatory framework. Law helped institutionalize
unions—to give them autonomy, power, and legitimacy. At the same time, it
subjected them to an increasingly restrictive regulatory scheme that made it
harder for them to act—or to be seen—as a social movement.

*
Fisk is the Barbara Nachtrieb Armstrong Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley. Reddy
is a Doctoral researcher in Jurisprudence and Social Policy, University of California, Berkeley; J.D., New York
University School of Law. Our title is drawn from labor and civil liberties activist Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, who
said: “There is less violence against labor today, but there are more legal restrictions . . . . There has been labor
protection by law but there has also been labor repression by law[.]” Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, Memories of the
Industrial Workers of the World (Nov. 8, 1962) (transcript available at http://www.sojust.net/speeches/
elizabeth_flynn_memories.html).
We are grateful for comments from Kathryn Abrams, Catherine Albiston, Erwin Chemerinsky, Scott
Cummings, Lauren Edelman, Gwendolyn Leachman, Nelson Lichtenstein, Michael McCann, Doug NeJaime,
Dylan Penningroth, César Rosado Marzán, Christopher Tomlins, and Vasanthi Venkatesh. We also thank
Catherine Powell, archivist of the Labor Archives and Research Center of the J. Paul Leonard Library at San
Francisco State University, for her assistance with materials on the history of the ILWU; Ryan Reft, archivist at
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Refocusing on labor re-centers the role of law in constructing the
jurisprudential boundaries which channeled social movement activity
throughout the twentieth century. As social movements today challenge these
boundaries in order to assert more intersectional grievances, interrogating
taken-for-granted notions about law and movements could not be more
important.
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Don’t call it a comeback
I’ve been here for years1
INTRODUCTION
On November 22, 2019, a New York Times headline proclaimed: Stunning
$93.6 Million Verdict Threatens to Bankrupt Major Union.2 The article
recounted an ordinary dispute between the Portland local chapter of the
International Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU) and the company that
operated the city port; workers had protested the company’s failure to hire union
members for two jobs.3 What was extraordinary about the dispute was that it
resulted in a $93.6 million jury verdict against the union.4 The ILWU’s total
assets in November 2019—every cent contributed by its working-class
members—were only $8 million.5 Accordingly, the article noted that if the
verdict were sustained, it could bankrupt the union, “embolden employers
frustrated by labor disruptions,” and “chill[] the activities of unions that are just
finding their footing after decades of setbacks.”6 In other words, the everyday
application of law would destroy a social movement organization and, perhaps
with it, quell a new wave of labor activism.
The year 2019 was not the first time that the ILWU (or other labor unions)
faced a potentially catastrophic verdict as a result of protest activity arising from
an everyday dispute. As we detail below, in 1949, the ILWU was hit with a
verdict worth about $8 million in 2020 dollars for picketing outside the Juneau
Spruce lumber mill in Alaska.7 The United States Supreme Court upheld the
1

L.L. Cool J, Mama Said Knock You Out, on MAMA SAID KNOCK YOU OUT (Def Jams Recordings

1990).
2
Mike Baker, Stunning $93.6 Million Verdict Threatens to Bankrupt Major Union, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
22, 2019, at A18.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id. After the initial jury verdict, the judge denied the defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of
law, ordered remittitur to $19 million, and, alternatively, a new trial on damages. ICTSI Oregon, Inc. v. Int’l
Longshore & Warehouse Union, 442 F. Supp. 3d 1329, 1338–39 (D. Or. 2020); Maxine Bernstein, Oregon
Jury’s $93.6 Million in Damages Verdict Against Longshore Union Reduced to $19 Million, OREGONIAN
(Mar. 5, 2020), https://www.oregonlive.com/crime/2020/03/judge-reduces-jurys-936-million-in-damagesverdict-against-longshore-union-to-19-million.html. After the plaintiff rejected the remittitur, the judge certified
the case for interlocutory appeal. Bill Mongelluzzo, ICTSI Portland Rejects $19 Million Award Against ILWU,
JOC (Mar. 21, 2020, 5:34 AM), https://www.joc.com/port-news/longshoreman-labor/ictsi-portland-rejects-19million-award-against-ilwu_20200321.html.
7
Int’l Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union v. Juneau Spruce Corp., 342 U.S. 237, 240 (1952);
CPI Inflation Calculator, BUREAU LAB. STAT., https://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl?cost1=750%2C000.00&
year1=194804&year2=202004 (last visited Sept. 5, 2020).
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judgment in 1952.8 This was the first major damages judgment to reach the Court
under the 1947 anti-labor Taft-Hartley Act, and the ensuing multi-year battle, in
the courts and out, for the union’s survival reveals how effectively business
interests used law to squelch social movement activism. At that time, the ILWU
was a multiracial, politically progressive, and activist union that was
transforming labor and the politics of the Pacific West by organizing tens of
thousands of farmworkers, food processors, and warehouse and dock workers
into one big democratically governed union.9 Capitalizing on the opportunity
presented by the verdict, company lawyers sought to use judgment collection
devices against the ILWU as a way to roll back organizing victories throughout
the West Coast and in Hawai’i.10 As the ILWU fought to stay afloat, it
understood law and courts to be on the side of its opponents.11 In the days after
the Supreme Court’s ruling, the ILWU’s newspaper summed up this view with
a political cartoon: In it, a bespectacled judge floats down from the heavens to
hand the court’s ruling, labeled “how to break strikes,” to a businessman sporting
top hat and cigar.12
The labor movement is a social movement, with a long history of shaping
law and being shaped by it in turn.13 At times constrained by law and at times
bolstered by it, the labor movement was one of the largest and most influential
social movements before 1950.14 Labor activism was crucial to the enactment of
the New Deal and to the period of relatively lower economic inequality in the

8
See Int’l Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union, 342 U.S. at 245; infra notes 295–96, and
accompanying text.
9
See infra Part II.A.
10
See infra Part II.C.
11
See Supreme Court Upholds $750,000 Against ILWU, DISPATCHER, Jan. 18, 1952, at 1 (describing the
Supreme Court’s decision as proof that the Truman Administration was working with employers “to put unions
out of business”).
12
Phil Drew, The New Strikebreaking Gimmick, DISPATCHER, Jan. 18, 1952, at 2.
13
See infra Part I.A (detailing our argument about how to conceptualize a “social movement” and why
labor—in its various incarnations—must qualify). Importantly, labor organizing is explicitly recognized by law
as protecting the public interest by “safeguard[ing] commerce from injury” and reducing the tendency of
unrestrained capitalism to “aggravate recurrent business depressions, by depressing wage rates and the
purchasing power of wage earners in industry.” 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2018). And collective action by workers,
including strikes, picketing, and boycotting, has been recognized by the Supreme Court for decades as
foundational to the system in which workers and employers self-regulate. See, e.g., NLRB v. Ins. Agents’ Int’l
Union, 361 U.S. 477, 489, 493–95 (1960) (noting that the “presence of economic weapons in reserve, and their
actual exercise on occasion by the parties, is part and parcel of the system that the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts
have recognized”); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101–02, 104 (1940) (declaring unconstitutional a
restriction on labor picketing even though it “may persuade some of those reached to refrain from entering into
advantageous relations with the business establishment”).
14
See Flynn, supra note *; supra notes 37–39 and accompanying text.
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mid-twentieth century United States.15 Today, even following decades of
deregulation of business and anti-labor decisions by courts and agencies, labor
unions remain an institutional force for redistribution and economic security.16
Unions engage in protest, the quintessential social movement activity, to achieve
their goals.17 Indeed, labor unions create an institutional channel for worker
protest.18 As illustrated by the wave of labor organizing and protest activity
during the COVID-19 crisis, unions can organize and mobilize those whose
interests are overlooked in business and politics as usual.19 The goal of this
mobilization, organizing, and protest is to challenge aspects of the status quo
and to redistribute wealth and power from those who have more to those who
have less.20 And yet, organized labor—and the ways in which it has experienced
law—has not been a primary case study within the law and social movements
literature.21 Instead, as labor scholar Jane McAlevey wrote in 2016, there has
been an “informal gestalt . . . that unions are not social movements at all.”22
15
See Richard Kirsch, The Future of Work in America: Policies to Empower American Workers and
Ensure Prosperity for All, ROOSEVELT INST. 2 (Mar. 25, 2014), https://rooseveltinstitute.org/future-workamerica-policies-empower-american-workers-and-secure-prosperity-all/.
16
Id. at 3.
17
See Baker, supra note 2.
18
See Dan Clawson & Mary Ann Clawson, What Has Happened to the U.S. Labor Movement? Union
Decline and Renewal, 25 ANN. REV. SOC. 95, 100 (1999) (“Unions are part of a legal regime that shapes and
channels worker organization and activism through specification of legally permissible and impermissible modes
of collective action and through the law’s very definition of workplace representation.”).
19
See, e.g., Alina Selyuhk & Shannon Bond, More Essential Than Ever, Low-Wage Workers Demand
More, NPR (Apr. 28, 2020, 3:27 PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/04/27/843849435/hometown-heroes-orwhatever-low-wage-workers-want-more-than-praise.
20
See, e.g., Advocate for Social and Economic Justice, AFL-CIO, https://aflcio.org/what-unionsdo/social-economic-justice (last visited May 12, 2020) (describing how labor unions “re-writ[e] the rules of the
economy, so they benefit the 99% instead of the wealthy few”).
21
As an empirical example of the field’s emphasis, we searched the Westlaw Journals and Law Reviews
database in December 2019 for “social movement” or “social movements” in article titles. The search produced
146 articles. Of those articles produced, only seven articles—approximately 5% of the total—focus on the
experience of the American labor movement. Among the twenty most-cited articles of those 146, i.e. those that
presumably have had the greatest impact on the field, at best one can be said to substantially engage with the
American labor movement. In contrast, six of those twenty (30%) emphasize the civil rights movement, and five
(25%) emphasize some aspect of the women’s movement.
22
Her full quote is as follows:

There’s an informal gestalt in much of academia that unions are not social movements at all: that
union equates to “undemocratic, top-down bureaucracy.” Yet not all so-called social movement
organizations (SMOs) fit their own definition of social; many function from the top down as
much as any bad union . . . Likewise, scholars assume that material gain is the primary concern
of unions, missing that workplace fights are most importantly about one of the deepest of human
emotional needs: dignity. The day in, day out degradation of peoples’ self-worth is what can drive
workers to form the solidarity needed to face today’s union busters.
JANE F. MCALEVEY, NO SHORTCUTS: ORGANIZING FOR POWER IN THE NEW GILDED AGE 1 (2016) (emphasis
omitted); see also JOSEPH E. LUDERS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT AND THE LOGIC OF SOCIAL CHANGE 57 n.6
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In this Article, we ask: How might the experiences of the labor movement,
and, in particular, labor unions as regulated by law,23 prove generative in
theorizing the relationship between law and social movements? In asking this
question, we seek to contribute to ongoing efforts to expand the boundaries of
law and social movements scholarship.24
Theory-building within the field of law and social movements has at times
been shaped by its primary case studies, especially the civil rights movement,
the women’s movement, and the LGBTQ movement. Although a few classic and
significant works have studied labor, the socio-historically specific ways in
which the labor movement has experienced law have not fully permeated the
literature.25 Thinking of organized labor as a primary case of the relationship
(2010) (“Curiously, the labor movement is conventionally ignored by scholars of social movements.”).
23
We focus more on unions in this Article than on an important and growing portion of the labor
movement: workers’ centers and other “alt-labor” organizations. As we discuss in Part III.D, the ways in which
unions and worker centers differ result, in part, from the ways in which law has regulated labor unions.
24
Our discussion focuses on the law and social movements literature and not on the sociological literature
on social movements or the political science literature on contentious politics (those fields have at times engaged
in similar line-drawing, see infra note 51). Although generalizing about the content and defining the boundaries
of the “law and social movements” literature is challenging, one useful synthesis of the field is provided by
Michael McCann, Law and Social Movements: Contemporary Perspectives, 2 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 17
(2006). Generally, we refer to a body of legal and socio-legal scholarship that attempts to generate theory about
the relationship between law and social movements. See infra Part I.A and Part I.C.
Outside of the legal literature, sociologists have studied labor as a movement. See TAMARA KAY,
NAFTA AND THE POLITICS OF LABOR TRANSNATIONALISM (2011); NEW LABOR IN NEW YORK: PRECARIOUS
WORKERS AND THE FUTURE OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT (Ruth Milkman & Ed Ott eds., 2014); Kim Voss, The
Collapse of a Social Movement: The Interplay of Mobilizing Structures, Framing, and Political Opportunities
in the Knights of Labor, in COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 227 (Doug McAdam, John D.
McCarthy & Mayer N. Zald eds., 1996). And studies of particular union campaigns have emphasized the
movement aspects of labor organizing. See, e.g., MARSHALL GANZ, WHY DAVID SOMETIMES WINS:
LEADERSHIP, ORGANIZATION, AND STRATEGY IN THE CALIFORNIA FARM WORKER MOVEMENT (2009).
25
As we detail in Part I.C, labor’s relationship with law has been richly studied by a few law and social
movements scholars, and by labor law scholars and legal historians, outside of the law and social movements
canon. See, e.g., SCOTT L. CUMMINGS, BLUE AND GREEN: THE DRIVE FOR JUSTICE AT AMERICA’S PORT (2018)
(studying law as a tool and a barrier to social movements in the context of movements responding to
environmental degradation and low-wage work); MICHAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY
REFORM AND THE POLITICS OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION (1994) (analyzing pay equity through a law and social
movements lens). A work that has crossed over from the field of labor legal history to become part of the law
and social movements canon considers the labor movement experience in depth. WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW
AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT 168–72 (1991). Among the many rich labor histories
that are relevant for studying the intersection of labor and other social movements are DOROTHY SUE COBBLE,
DISHING IT OUT: WAITRESSES AND THEIR UNIONS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1991) and ROBERT RODGERS
KORSTAD, CIVIL RIGHTS UNIONISM: TOBACCO WORKERS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY IN THE MIDTWENTIETH-CENTURY SOUTH (2003). Works that shed light on the effect of law on labor as a movement include:
KAREN ORREN, BELATED FEUDALISM: LABOR, THE LAW, AND LIBERAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
(1991); Catherine Fisk, Still “Learning Something of Legislation”: The Judiciary in the History of Labor Law,
19 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 151 (1994) (surveying the literature on the effect of law on the American labor
movement); Joel Rogers, Divide and Conquer: Further “Reflections on the Distinctive Character of American
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between law and social movements accordingly has the potential to complicate
some of the more taken-for-granted notions in the field, and with them the sociolegal imaginary of how social movements engage with law. The rights-focused
movements of the latter half of the twentieth century have a familial resemblance
in their relationship with law. They are envisioned, especially in the legal
literature, as coalescing into lawyer-led advocacy organizations that wielded law
to achieve broad cultural change through rights invocations, but that struggled
to translate those wins into material gains on the ground.26 The labor movement,
particularly as it has been regulated by law since 1947, stands out as an
alternative model for how movements and law intersect.
In addition, refocusing on labor creates space for a richer theorization of how
law mediates the relationships among social movements. The Juneau Spruce
case study shows that law seized upon the strengths of labor as a movement—
its reliance on in-the-streets protest, its promotion of solidarity across entire
economic sectors and geographic regions, and its institutional power drawn from
member dues—and regulated them to deprive them of potency.27 As other
scholars have shown, the social movements that arose later, including the civil
rights and women’s movements, sought alternate pathways to justice; they
avoided the legal pitfalls that weakened labor, yet eventually bumped into
jurisprudential constraints of their own.28
Our discussion proceeds as follows. In Part I, we trace the pathways by
which labor came to be de-emphasized in law and social movements studies and

Labor Laws”, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 1 (1990).
Partly in reaction to the limited focus of canonical law and social movements literature, a related field
is beginning to flourish that focuses on law and organizing. This can be seen in both legal scholarship, see, e.g.,
Kate Andrias & Benjamin I. Sachs, Constructing Countervailing Power: Law and Organizing in an Era of
Political Inequality, 129 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2020); Scott L. Cummings & Ingrid V. Eagly, A Critical
Reflection on Law and Organizing, 48 UCLA L. REV. 443 (2001); Jennifer Gordon, Law, Lawyers, and Labor:
The United Farm Workers’ Legal Strategy in the 1960s and 1970s and the Role of Law in Union Organizing
Today, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 1, 10–13 (2005); James Gray Pope, Labor-Community Coalitions and
Boycotts: The Old Labor Law, the New Unionism, and the Living Constitution, 69 TEX. L. REV. 889, 911–13
(1991); Benjamin I. Sachs, Law, Organizing, and Status Quo Vulnerability, 96 TEX. L. REV. 351, 376–77 (2017),
and in law school-based law reform projects, see, e.g., Berkeley Law and Organizing Collective, BERKELEY L.,
https://www.law.berkeley.edu/experiential/pro-bono-program/slps/current-slps-projects/berkeley-law-andorganizing-collective/ (last visited Sept. 5, 2020); Workers, Law, and Organizing Clinic, UCLA L., https://
curriculum.law.ucla.edu/Guide/Course/6554 (last visited Sept. 5, 2020). Another important forthcoming article
theorizes that legal scholars should “cogenerate law” by thinking in partnership with current Left social
movements, including BLM and workers’ movements. Amna Akbar, Sameer Ashar & Jocelyn Simonson,
Movement Law, 70 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 2).
26
See infra Part I.C.
27
See infra Part I.B.I.
28
See infra notes 140–142 and accompanying text.
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discuss how the emphasis on other movements can be understood to have shaped
the field. We focus on five dimensions of the scholarship that do not fully reflect
labor’s experiences.
In Part II, we use our extensive archival work to reconstruct the ILWU’s
1948 to 1955 struggle against the potentially ruinous Juneau Spruce damages
judgment; we show how labor’s unique regulatory regime was mobilized by
opponents to constrain movement activity. The restriction on labor protest
occurred just as a new cycle of protest began, the “rights revolution” of the 1950s
(this phrase itself reflects the line-drawing we interrogate, since the
understanding of certain claims as “rights” is a product of how movements have,
and have not, engaged with law).29
In Part III, we draw from this case study to suggest ways in which refocusing on labor’s experience with law complicates understanding of the
relationship between law and social movements, and specifically, how it
enriches the five dimensions of the field identified in Part I. We also argue that
reintegrating labor into the literature demonstrates the importance of studying
the relationships among social movements, as mediated by law, over time and
space. As one primary example, law helped construct the labor and civil rights
movements as increasingly distinct from each other, by prohibiting labor unions
(but not civil rights groups) from engaging in the forms of social movement
activism—mass picketing and sector-wide boycotts—that came to be the model
for protest after the 1950s. We conclude with thoughts on the future of labor as
a social movement.
As movements today seek to assert more intersectional grievances, the legal
boundaries that gave movements their shape throughout the twentieth century
merit further scrutiny. Today, an increasing number of labor organizations
challenge the multiple inequalities that impact their members’ lives.30 Similarly,
the “new civil rights movement”—as the Black Lives Matter protests of 2020
have been called—center reforms that would build the welfare state and address
economic inequality.31 But the ways in which legal constraints have channeled
29
See CHARLES R. EPP, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: LAWYERS, ACTIVISTS, AND SUPREME COURTS IN
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1998) (employing the phrase “rights revolution” in an analysis that excludes labor
unions from its understanding of social movement organizations, during the time period in which labor was
arguably the most vibrant as a movement).
30
See, e.g., SERV. EMPS. INT’L UNION, www.seiu.org (last visited June 27, 2020) (demanding protection
for “ALL immigrants” because “unless we act together to protect ALL people we are ALL at risk” and
announcing SEIU support for the Movement for Black Lives).
31
See BLM’s #WhatMatters2020, BLACK LIVES MATTER, www.blacklivesmatter.com/what-matters2020/ (last visited June 27, 2020) (announcing that BLM’s #WhatMatters2020 campaign “will focus on issues
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these movements, and the cultural adaptations that have followed, still have
sway. Unpacking that history is, as always, essential to escaping it.
I.

THE TIES THAT DIVIDE

We begin with the puzzle motivating our intervention: labor and other social
movements have yet to receive widespread study together in the legal or sociolegal literature (or elsewhere, for that matter). Labor and its experiences with
law have primarily been studied in one corner of the legal academy, while in
another corner, the law and social movements literature has focused mainly on
movements arising in the latter half of the twentieth century and their sociohistorically specific approach to law. This stubborn line-drawing has shaped the
trajectory of both fields. In section A, we discuss how and why labor and other
social movements came to be studied separately. In section B, we discuss labor’s
experience with law. And in section C, we highlight five ongoing conversations
in the law and social movements literature, which refocusing on labor has the
potential to complicate.
A. Enduring Divisions in the Study of Law and Movements
Labor has often been studied separately from other social movements for a
number of reasons—some purposeful, and some less so. Here, we trace the
pathways by which these similar social phenomena came to be conceptualized
distinctly.
1. The Dominance of “Rights”
The interdisciplinary literature on law and social movements is an essential
resource for legal scholars and practitioners interested in the relationship
between law and social change. Contained in law reviews, books by legal and
socio-legal scholars, and interdisciplinary legal and social science journals, this
literature has often focused on the experiences of the civil rights movement and
on other movements which, since the 1950s, have made rights claims for
historically marginalized groups.32 As Scott Cummings recently said, “[t]he
concerning racial injustice, police brutality, criminal justice reform, Black immigration, economic injustice,
LGBTQIA+ and human rights, environmental injustice, access to healthcare, access to quality education, and
voting rights and suppression”).
32
This emphasis can be seen with some of the earliest works in the field. See, e.g., JOEL F. HANDLER,
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A THEORY OF LAW REFORM AND SOCIAL CHANGE (1978). One
important social movement that does not fit this mold and has received significant attention in the literature is
the environmental movement (which we do not theorize in this Article). See, e.g., Alan Hunt, Rights and Social
Movements: Counter-Hegemonic Strategies, 17 J.L. & SOC’Y 309, 318 (1990) (naming “three of the most
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story of how and why social movements have come to matter within
contemporary legal scholarship takes off at the moment of crisis within
progressive legal thought caused by Brown [v. Board of Education].”33
Catherine Albiston and Gwendolyn Leachman likewise attribute to Brown and
the civil rights movement the intense scholarly scrutiny of “whether and how
law operates as an instrument of social change.”34 And as law and society
scholars Austin Sarat and Stuart Scheingold have written: “[t]he last half of the
twentieth century in the United States was, in part, a story of law’s role in
movements for social change[.]”35 This subject-specific and time-limited
emphasis has constrained the field’s theoretical horizons, leading to a focus on
how and why social movements succeed or fail in generating social change via
law.36
In contrast, the literature has had less to say about organized labor.37 The
literature’s ambivalence about theorizing organized labor’s engagement with
law, from a century before Brown38 through today, is a missed opportunity to

important social movements” as the civil rights movement, the women’s movement, and the environmental
movement); see also Thomas W. Merrill, Foreword: Two Social Movements, 21 ECOLOGY L.Q. 331, 331 (1994)
(arguing that “[t]wo social movements in the last fifty years have had a profound impact on our understanding
of law and the role of the courts in our system of government[:] . . . the civil rights movement . . . [and] the
environmental movement”).
33
Scott L. Cummings, The Social Movement Turn in Law, 43 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 360, 365 (2018)
[hereinafter Turn]; see Scott L. Cummings, The Puzzle of Social Movements in American Legal Theory, 64
UCLA L. REV. 1554, 1556, 1556 n.4 (2017) [hereinafter Puzzle] (identifying “the zenith of social movements in
American politics” as being when Martin Luther King, Jr. led civil rights protesters across the bridge in Selma).
It is important to note here that Scott Cummings has done some of the best recent work on labor activism, and
thus, notwithstanding his accurate account of the periodization of the social movement literature, his own work
does treat labor as an essential part of the contemporary social movement landscape. See CUMMINGS, supra note
25.
34
Catherine R. Albiston & Gwendolyn M. Leachman, Law as an Instrument of Social Change, in 13
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL & BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 542, 542 (James D. Wright ed., 2d
ed. 2015).
35
Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold, What Cause Lawyers Do For, and To, Social Movements: An
Introduction, in CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 1, 1 (Austin Sarat & Stuart A. Scheingold eds.,
2006) (emphasis added).
36
See, e.g., Cummings, Puzzle, supra note 33, at 1556 (noting that social movements “have now achieved
a privileged position in legal scholarship as engines of progressive transformation”); Edward L. Rubin, Passing
Through the Door: Social Movement Literature and Legal Scholarship, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 2 (2001) (arguing
that legal scholarship on social movements, in contrast to the literature on social movements in other disciplines,
focuses on “the movements’ specific effect on the decisions of courts, legislatures, and administrative agencies”).
37
See supra note 21. As we noted above, there are significant exceptions. See supra notes 24–29.
38
Labor’s movement activism and struggles with and against law go back to the early nineteenth century,
if not before. See, e.g., MELVYN DUBOFSKY, THE STATE AND LABOR IN MODERN AMERICA 18–49 (1994);
FORBATH, supra note 25, at 2–8; CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, THE STATE AND THE UNIONS: LABOR RELATIONS,
LAW, AND THE ORGANIZED LABOR MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1880–1960, at 36–44 (1985); SEAN WILENTZ,
CHANTS DEMOCRATIC: NEW YORK CITY AND THE RISE OF THE AMERICAN WORKING CLASS, 1788–1850, at 33–
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engage with one of the largest and most consequential social movements of the
twentieth century.39
2. Seeing Labor as a Social Movement
To some extent, the exclusion of labor is a purposeful one. While it is
relatively easy to name the insurgent labor activism of the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries a movement,40 organized labor in the decades that
followed did not always seem like one. Even those most sympathetic to the cause
questioned whether organized labor was a social movement during the mid-tolate twentieth century, given its increasing institutionalization, relative political
moderation, and ongoing failures to actively challenge racism and sexism within
its ranks.41 In particular, the tendency of some unions during that time to see
Black, Latinx, and Asian workers (and many recent immigrants) as a threat to
union power and solidarity, rather than as allies in a common struggle, deeply
undermined labor’s credibility and efficacy as an agent of reform.42 As a result,
Kim Voss and Rachel Sherman argued, “organized labor had become more like
an institutionalized interest group than a social movement.”43
But the line between interest group and social movement is anything but
bright, and it has often been tied to normative judgment as much as empirical
assessment.44 Much of organized labor may have become relatively

35 (20th anniversary ed. 1984).
39
Union membership grew from 7.5% of employed workers in 1930 to 19.2% of employed workers in
1939 to 28.3% of employed workers in 1954. GERALD MAYER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32553, UNION
MEMBERSHIP TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES 23 (2004) (using Bureau of Labor Statistics data). Counting only
nonagricultural workers, union membership grew from 28.6% in 1939 (the first year in which data was collected)
to 35.4% in 1945. Id. Between 1930 and 1941, over 6.8 million people joined unions. Id.
40
One of the relatively few canonical law and social movements works on labor focuses on this time
period. See FORBATH, supra note 25.
41
Kim Voss & Rachel Sherman, Breaking the Iron Law of Oligarchy: Union Revitalization in the
American Labor Movement, 106 AM. J. SOCIO. 303, 303–04 (2000).
42
Racism among union leaders and rank-and-file unions members, was a pervasive problem, particularly
in certain industries. See generally THOMAS J. SUGRUE, SWEET LAND OF LIBERTY: THE FORGOTTEN STRUGGLE
FOR CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE NORTH (2008) (describing racism and anti-Black violence by labor unions in the
North); BRUCE NELSON, DIVIDED WE STAND: AMERICAN WORKERS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR BLACK EQUALITY
(2001) (describing racism among longshore workers and steelworkers in selected cities nationwide).
43
Voss & Sherman, supra note 41, at 304.
44
Scholars have accordingly struggled to articulate a workable definition of a social movement. We do
not wade into that debate here, other than to say that we think there is value in conceptualizing organized labor
as one. We note that some scholars have also attempted to distinguish between “social movements” and “social
movement organizations,” and that as applied to labor, this has resulted in line drawing between “labor
movements” and “labor unions.” See John D. McCarthy & Mayer N. Zald, Resource Mobilization and Social
Movements: A Partial Theory, 82 AM. J. SOCIO. 1212, 1217–18 (1977) (distinguishing between social
movements and social movement organizations); Clawson & Clawson, supra note 18, at 109 (discussing the
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conventional and bureaucratic in its methods, tepid in its demands, and moderate
in its vision of an ideal society in the latter half of the twentieth century. Still, as
Voss and Sherman caution, “[w]e have a fascination with the new and the
dramatic in the social movement field and are often disdainful of older
movements. Yet to limit our focus narrows our theoretical vision.”45 Organized
labor was not as new or dynamic in the 1950s as it was before, and as it may
appear again now. But, to suggest it was not a social movement goes too far.
There is value in thinking of organized labor, even in its bureaucratic
incarnation, as a social movement, even if not every union acts like one.46 Labor
unions engage in collective action—including protest—for the purpose of
challenging existing economic and political power relationships. The definition
of a social movement should be broad enough to encompass working-class
people’s collective defiance of workplace authoritarianism to seek redistribution
of both wealth and power. Moreover, to understand the relationship between law
and social movements, it is essential to see that unions’ mid-century
conservativism and institutionalization resulted, in part, from how they were
regulated by law.47 To exclude labor from consideration because of its

paradoxical nature of the institutional labor union as reliant on the labor movement more broadly for its
existence). While that distinction is important in some contexts, we do not belabor it here. As Clawson and
Clawson have argued, labor unions must both operate as bureaucratic organizations and also “constitute and
reconstitute themselves as social movements” in order to achieve their goals. Clawson & Clawson, supra note
18, at 109. As such, we use the terms “labor movement,” “organized labor,” and “unions” relatively
interchangeably throughout, except when greater precision is important for our analysis.
45
Voss & Sherman, supra note 41, at 344.
46
A number of scholars of labor, both in and outside of law schools, have studied the ways in which
unions have failed to organize, mobilize, or advocate the interests of people of color, women, or even workers
generally. See generally, e.g., PAUL FRYMER, BLACK AND BLUE: AFRICAN AMERICANS, THE LABOR MOVEMENT,
AND THE DECLINE OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY (2008) (discussing the experience of African Americans in the
American labor movement); Marion Crain & Ken Matheny, Labor’s Identity Crisis, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1767
(2001) (discussing the ways in which unionization fragments workers from their race, gender, and class
identities).
47
The argument that unions are interest groups rather than social movement actors is, as we have said,
more normative than descriptive. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. But even where it is an accurate
description, it oversimplifies and flattens the complex historical process by which labor organizations became
less committed to mass organization and economic transformation. Exhibit A for the proposition that labor
unions ceased being social movement actors in favor of being interest groups is the famous comment of AFLCIO President George Meany in 1972, when he was asked about declining membership: “Frankly, I used to
wonder about the . . . size of the membership. But quite a few years ago I just stopped worrying about it, because
to me it doesn’t make any difference.” REUEL SCHILLER, FORGING RIVALS: RACE, CLASS, LAW, AND THE
COLLAPSE OF POSTWAR LIBERALISM 230 (2015). As Schiller argues, “industrial pluralist labor law that
developed in the immediate postwar period may have foreclosed a radical reconnection of the role that unions
were to play in American society” and the increasingly conservative labor law of the 1970s made labororganizing well-nigh impossible and reduced labor political power even more. Id. at 231.
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relationship with law is to miss out on an opportunity to understand how law
changes a movement.
The literature on “social movement unionism” (as opposed to “business
unionism” or just plain unionism) is similarly premised on the argument that not
all unions act like social movement organizations.48 While we agree with the
normative critique of unions which fail to prioritize solidarity with other
marginalized groups, or worse, wield their collective power against such groups,
we think it confuses the normative and the theoretical to treat organized labor’s
status as a social movement as conditional. Instead, we see organized labor—
whose power is rooted in protest and whose goal is redistribution—as a social
movement, however limited and imperfect, in its own right. We find the term
“social justice unionism” theoretically limiting for similar reasons.
Distinguishing social justice unionism from unionism generally suggests that
wages and benefits are not themselves “social justice” issues. Drawing from
critical race theory, we prefer the term intersectional unionism for the kind of
unions which seek to address the multiple inequalities in their members’ lives
and communities.49
3. Ongoing Boundary Work
The tendency to overlook labor—both in the law and social movements
literature and in the disciplinary study of social movements50—is not solely the
product of purposeful exclusion, however; it also verges on hegemonic.51 It has
often been taken for granted that labor is fundamentally distinct from other forms

48
See, e.g., RICK FANTASIA & KIM VOSS, HARD WORK: REMAKING THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT
120 (2004) (describing the “practices and possibilities of a social movement unionism” as a distinct form of
labor activism) (capitalization altered).
49
See Hajer Al-Faham, Angelique M. Davis & Rose Ernst, Intersectionality: From Theory to Practice,
15 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 247 (2019).
50
Clawson & Clawson, supra note 18, at 96 (noting that “sociologists . . . have devoted surprisingly little
attention to the labor movement,” and reflecting that “[a]s a discipline centrally concerned with processes of
institutional functioning, social movement activism, and class differentiation and domination, this relative
neglect is striking”); see also Gabriel Hetland & Jeff Goodwin, The Strange Disappearance of Capitalism from
Social Movement Studies, in MARXISM AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 83, 84–86 (Colin Barker, Laurence Cox, John
Krinsky & Alf Gunvald Nilsen eds., 2014) (noting that social movement studies have failed to pay adequate
attention to organized labor and other economic movements in recent decades and have failed to adequately
interrogate political economy when theorizing movement activity).
51
This ongoing line-drawing is evident within the leading academic organizations whose members study
social movements. In the American Sociological Association, there are separate groups for social movement and
labor movement research and scholarship, and in the Law and Society Association, there are separate research
groups for law and social movements and labor rights. See ASA Sections, AM. SOCIO. ASS’N, https://www.asanet.
org/asa-communities/asa-sections (last visited Sept. 5, 2020); Collaborative Research Networks, LAW & SOC’Y
ASS’N, https://www.lawandsociety.org/crn.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2020).
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of collective behavior.52 This is partly about path dependency; organized labor
emerged well before the other movements prioritized by the field. But it is also
because of the intractable problem within social movement theory (and arguably
within all social theory) of how to reconcile the economic and the socio-political.
We discuss each of these issues, in turn.
Temporally, labor gained both power and prominence in the early-to-mid
twentieth century, before the modern conceptualization of a social movement
fully emerged.53 Owing to its success in gaining institutional power in the 1930s
and 1940s, labor was no longer seen as a movement; it was an economic
institution.54 It accordingly was integrated into academia either on its own terms
(as in “labor studies” or “labor law”) or as part of a broader study of economic
issues (as in “industrial relations”).55
The study of social movements, as a category distinct from labor, followed
a distinct trajectory. Prior to the 1960s, academics tended to view “collective
behavior” skeptically, largely because Nazism and fascism were the leading case
studies.56 Engaging in politics outside of the political system was generally
presumed irrational57 or deviant, because then-dominant pluralist political
theory asserted that the political system was accessible to all.58
With the increasing national prominence of the civil rights movement in the
1950s and 1960s, however, academics began to reconsider their normative and
empirical approaches to social movements.59 Movements could now be
understood as a rational reaction to an unequally accessible political system—
and this made them seem worthy of more systematic study.60 Social scientists
developed resource mobilization and political process theories to explain why,

52

See supra notes 24, 51, and accompanying text.
Compare Voss & Sherman, supra note 41, at 310–11 (discussing the decline of labor as the twentieth
century progressed), with infra notes 59–63 and accompanying text (highlighting the new conceptualizations of
social movements that began to emerge at the turn of the twentieth century).
54
Voss & Sherman, supra note 41.
55
See supra note 51.
56
See, e.g., SIDNEY G. TARROW, STRUGGLE, POLITICS, AND REFORM: COLLECTIVE ACTION, SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS, AND CYCLES OF PROTEST 25 (1989).
57
Later scholarship would reflect on the irrationality of collective action from a micro-economic rather
than a political process perspective; and in that account, labor was a principal case study. MANCUR OLSON, THE
LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965).
58
See, e.g., Louis Lindsay, The Pluralist Persuasion in American Democratic Thought, 22 SOC. & ECON.
STUD. 479, 484–87 (1973).
59
See SIDNEY TARROW, POWER IN MOVEMENT: COLLECTIVE ACTION, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND
CONTENTIOUS POLITICS (2d. ed. 1998).
60
Id.
53
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how, and when social movements might rationally emerge.61 Both treat social
movements as instrumental, strategic action, deploying the resources available
to them or seizing upon political opportunities, in order to achieve goals.62 With
the “cultural turn” of the 1980s, scholars began to reincorporate questions of
meaning-making, culture, identity, and emotions into their analyses of social
movements, but this time, with the added recognition that politics and law, too,
involve signification struggles.63
By the time the study of social movements claimed its own intellectual
space, there were a number of barriers to incorporating labor as an appropriate
object of study. Labor was already being studied in other departments and
schools.64 In addition, labor unions were in decline, both in power and perhaps
more so in terms of legitimacy as a social movement.65 As noted above, much
of the New Left deemed the majority of labor unions to be bureaucratic interest
groups rather than social movement organizations.66 In part, this was because
labor was no longer a “protest” movement seeking rights from the state.67
Having gained such rights in the 1930s, labor now largely deployed its power in
the “private” sphere, seeking redistribution directly from corporations.68 Labor
was different from other social movement actors: it was institutional, whereas
social movements were thought to be noninstitutional; it used protest to
influence business organizations, whereas they used protest to influence state
policy.69 Moreover, many labor unions were not meaningfully engaged in
struggles against racial and gender oppression, or other progressive causes, at
that time.70

61
See id. at 24–25; see also Aldon D. Morris, A Retrospective on the Civil Rights Movement: Political
and Intellectual Landmarks, 25 ANN. REV. SOCIO. 517, 527 (1999) (arguing that “the civil rights movement was
the catalyst behind the wave of social movements that crystallized in the United States beginning in the middle
of the 1960s and continuing to the present”).
62
See supra notes 59–61 and accompanying text.
63
See James M. Jasper, Cultural Approaches in the Sociology of Social Movements, in HANDBOOK OF
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS ACROSS DISCIPLINES 59 (Bert Klandermans & Conny Roggeband eds., 2010); see also
Douglas NeJaime, Constitutional Change, Courts, and Social Movements, 111 MICH. L. REV. 877, 879 (2013)
(outlining major theoretical advances within the disciplinary study of social movements and how they might
improve understanding of law and social movements).
64
See supra note 51.
65
See Voss & Sherman, supra note 41, at 304, 310–11.
66
Id. at 304.
67
Id. at 310–11.
68
Id. at 310.
69
See infra Part I.C.2.
70
See, e.g., DOROTHY SUE COBBLE, THE OTHER WOMEN’S MOVEMENT: WORKPLACE JUSTICE AND
SOCIAL RIGHTS IN MODERN AMERICA (2004) (theorizing women’s involvement in the labor movement as
separate from the broader feminist movement).
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The disjuncture between labor movements and other social movements is
about more than path dependence, though. It also represents the limitations of
existing theories about the relationship between the economic and the cultural,
the material and the ideational. Here, the long shadow of Marx and Marxist
scholarship has often been read to occupy the field of studying class conflict,
and therefore labor movements.71 And because Marxist scholars were thought
to be interested only in the working class and not in other potential agents of
social transformation, social movement scholars have often understood
themselves to be building a new field of study which would focus on all
movements but labor.72
Within the sociological literature on social movements, one theoretical move
which treats labor as fundamentally different from other movements is the
distinction drawn between “old” and “new” social movements.73 Here, old social
movements—of which labor is the paradigmatic example—are understood as
focusing on material inequalities.74 In contrast, new social movements are postmaterial, concerned about identity and ideology.75 While the old-versus-new
taxonomy has been criticized for its simplicity, the intuition that something about
social movements changed in the mid-twentieth century continues to shape the
field. Nancy Fraser has attempted to rehabilitate the “class” versus “identity”
debate by drawing a distinction between a “politics of redistribution” and a
“politics of recognition.”76 Yet, as others have noted, even this distinction fails
to capture the complexity of the issue.77 Labor always fought for dignity, not
just money; for roses, and not just bread.78 And recognition and inclusion have
71
See COLIN BARKER, LAURENCE COX, JOHN KRINSKY & ALF GUNVALD NILSEN, Marxism and Social
Movements: An Introduction, in MARXISM AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 1, 1–3 (Colin Barker, Laurence Cox, John
Krinsky & Alf Gunvald Nilsen eds., 2013).
72
Some more recent Marxist scholarship has sought to challenge this line-drawing and to use Marx as a
starting point for understanding all movements. See, e.g., id.
73
See, e.g., Alberto Melucci, The New Social Movements: A Theoretical Approach, 19 SOC. SCI. INFO.
199, 199–201 (1980).
74
Id. at 199–200.
75
Id. at 217–22.
76
Nancy Fraser, Social Justice in the Age of Identity Politics: Redistribution, Recognition, and
Participation, Tanner Lecture on Human Values (Apr. 30–May 2, 1996) (transcript available at the University
of Utah’s Tanner Lecture Library).
77
See Judith Butler, Merely Cultural, NEW LEFT REV. (Jan. 1998), https://newleftreview.org/issues/I227/
articles/judith-butler-merely-cultural.
78
Indeed, the “bread and roses” metaphor that rejects prioritization of economic over cultural
transformation as a goal of movement activism comes from a poem adopted as an anthem by women textile
workers on strike in Lawrence, Massachusetts in 1912:
Our lives shall not be sweated from birth until life closes—
Hearts starve as well as bodies: Give us bread, but give us roses.
James Oppenheimer, Bread and Roses, 73 AM. MAG. 214, 214 (1911).
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material consequences, not merely psychological ones. In other words, there is
much lost in these categorization schemes. This is not to say that there are no
meaningful distinctions between these movements; this Article is about many of
them. Rather, it is to say that those distinctions are not inevitable, but
constructed; things to be explained rather than assumed. In Part III.C, we argue
that law, coupled with socio-historic contingency, has played an undertheorized
role in building these movements as separate and apart from each other.
Similar theoretical assumptions color legal scholarship’s disparate treatment
of labor and other movements. Scott Cummings explains how class and race
have been relegated to entirely different jurisprudential areas: the class-based
perspective of legal realists and critical legal scholars, on the one hand, and the
race-based perspective of mid-twentieth century liberals, progressives, and
critical race scholars, on the other.79 He argues that the first category of theorists,
consistent with a Marxian understanding of the limits of “political freedom”
under law, tend to be skeptical of the judiciary’s ability to effect progressive
change and rely, instead, on the political branches.80 In contrast, those who came
of age with a reverence for the Warren Court tend to view the judiciary as a
powerful check on the majoritarian political process, and as an essential defender
of minority rights.81 Cummings argues that insights from labor have largely been
incorporated into critical legal studies, whereas insights from other movements
dominate the law and social movements literature.82
In another variation on this theme, Edward Rubin conceptualizes the
jurisprudential importance of social movements and argues that the “social”
represents a separate category of human action, distinct from both the
“economic” and the “political.”83 He posits that the study of law and social
movements is about conceptualizing how the social can be generative of law in
the same way that the economic and the political can be.84 Under this scheme, it
is unclear if labor, or other movements that are regarded as partially or fully
economic in goals and orientation, should even qualify as social movements.
Yet, from a law and political economy perspective, such an understanding of the
economic as a separate sphere from the socio-political is itself a hallmark of the
neoliberal era, which has done much to naturalize increasing economic
inequality (and the weakening of labor unions) as an economic necessity rather
79
80
81
82
83
84

Cummings, Turn, supra note 33, at 365–68.
Id. at 366–67.
Id.
Id. at 367–68.
Rubin, supra note 36, at 3–5.
Id.
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than a socio-political choice.85 Consistent with this dichotomy between the
economic and the socio-political, some of the law and social movements
scholarship that does consider labor unions has tended to distinguish their
“movement” aspects from their “bread and butter” work fighting for wages and
benefits for low- and middle-income people. For example, most of Lani
Guinier’s and Gerald Torres’ account of the United Farm Workers focuses on
Teatro Campesino and almost none focuses on strikes, boycotts, or contracts.86
At the same time, a growing body of scholarship challenges these
constructed boundaries between the labor movement (or worker activism more
generally) and other social movements. For example, Michael McCann, Scott
Cummings, Kate Andrias, and Ben Sachs, among others, study labor as a
movement.87 McCann’s influential book, Rights at Work—now part of the law
and social movements canon—focuses on campaigns for pay equity both
through legislation and litigation, and through unions’ organizing in
workplaces.88 In this Article, we build upon their work to more directly
interrogate the boundaries of the field, and to explore how refocusing on labor
enriches the study of the relationship between law and social movements.
B. Labor as a Social Movement
Although labor has not been a primary case study within canonical law and
social movements literature, labor movement activism has been extensively
studied within legal academia, by labor law scholars and legal historians. In this
section, we review the literature on labor and law.
1. Law as the Problem
The literature on organized labor’s encounters with law is vast and has varied
over time. While some early labor scholars saw reason for optimism about what

85
See KATHARINA PISTOR, THE CODE OF CAPITAL: HOW THE LAW CREATES WEALTH AND INEQUALITY
1–2 (2019); David Singh Grewal, The Laws of Capitalism, 128 HARV. L. REV. 626, 655–56 (2014) (reviewing
THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2014)).
86
See, e.g., Lani Guinier & Gerald Torres, Changing the Wind: Notes Toward a Demosprudence of Law
and Social Movements, 123 Yale L.J. 2740, 2786–91 (2014).
87
See MCCANN, supra note 25; MICHAEL W. MCCANN & GEORGE I. LOVELL, UNION BY LAW: FILIPINO
AMERICAN LABOR ACTIVISTS, RIGHTS RADICALISM, AND RACIAL CAPITALISM (2020); SCOTT L. CUMMINGS, AN
EQUAL PLACE: LAWYERS IN THE STRUGGLE FOR LOS ANGELES (2020); Andrias & Sachs, supra note 25; Michael
M. Oswalt, Alt-Bargaining, 82 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89 (2019).
88
See MCCANN, supra note 25. To be clear, Rights at Work does not claim to be a study of law and social
movements; it is about legal mobilization by workers and how law shapes, as constraint and opportunity,
struggles for change in the workplace. Id. at 9–11.
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law might do for labor,89 most have theorized law as a mechanism of control
imposed on movement activism, rather than a tool proactively wielded by
movements.
Prior to labor’s precipitous decline after 1970, a decline seen as tied to an
increasingly archaic and constraining legal regime, labor law scholars tended to
be more sanguine about law.90 Given massive state repression of labor in the late
1800s and early 1900s, many scholars initially saw the New Deal era laws that
protected labor organizing as important victories for the labor movement.91
These laws—the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932,92 which prohibited injunctions
in labor disputes, and the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (NLRA or
Wagner Act),93 which protected the right to organize, collectively bargain, and
strike—helped shield labor protest from state repression and legitimized
workers’ rights to engage in collective action.94

89
See generally, e.g., Archibald Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (pt.
1), 61 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1947) (exploring the possibilities offered to labor by the Wagner Act); Matthew W.
Finkin, Revisionism in Labor Law, 43 MD. L. REV. 23 (1984) (critiquing two scholars positing the
deradicalization of the labor movement by courts after the Wagner Act); Harry Schulman, Reason, Contract,
and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARV. L. REV. 999 (1955) (speaking positively about the law and reason
underlying the collective labor agreement system). They came in for a great deal of criticism in the 1970s and
1980s for articulating a vision of labor law that failed to protect labor’s right to build worker power. See, e.g.,
Staughton Lynd, Government Without Rights: The Labor Law Vision of Archibald Cox, 4 INDUS. REL. L.J. 483,
483 n.2 (1981); James Gray Pope, The Thirteenth Amendment Versus the Commerce Clause: Labor and the
Shaping of American Constitutional Law, 1921–1957, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2002). Blame has also been placed
on courts and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) for interpreting the statutes in a way that subverted
the power they gave labor. See generally JAMES A. GROSS, BROKEN PROMISE: THE SUBVERSION OF U.S. LABOR
RELATIONS POLICY, 1947–1994 (1995) (discussing the NLRB’s lack of consistency toward labor policy over the
years and the Court’s history of substituting its policy preferences for those of Congress); Karl Klare, The
Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937–1941, 62
MINN. L. REV. 265, 269 (1978) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s early decisions interpreting the Wagner Act
narrowed the range of legitimate labor activity and thereby “did . . . much to guide the long-run development of
the labor movement into domesticated channels and, indeed, to impede workers’ interests”); Katherine Van
Wezel Stone, The Post-War Paradigm in American Labor Law, 90 YALE L.J. 1509 (1981) (critiquing the
industrial pluralist model and the relationship between courts and the NLRB that underlies it). Nevertheless,
even the critics of labor law regard the fundamental principle of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)—the
right of a subset of employees to engage in concerted activity for mutual aid and protection—as being a core
aspect of legal protection for movement building. See Staughton Lynd, Communal Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1417,
1423 (1984) (noting that, “[m]ore than any other institution in capitalist society, the labor movement is based on
communal values,” and that the Critical Legal Studies critique of rights rhetoric “misses the mark when it applies
its critical analysis to the right to engage in concerted labor activities”).
90
See supra note 89.
91
See supra note 89.
92
47 Stat. 70 (1932); 29 U.S.C. §§ 101–115.
93
49 Stat. 449 (1935); 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–166.
94
In addition to some of the early work cited above, supra note 89, recognizing the potential of law to
protect labor against repression, some recent work has credited vigorous enforcement of the Wagner Act with
enabling labor movement success in social and economic transformation. See MOON-KIE JUNG, REWORKING
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But labor (with the significant exceptions of agricultural and domestic
workers and independent contractors) won these limited rights decades ago.95 In
the years since, labor has lost much more than it has won via the state. The most
important of these losses was the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947.96 Enacted by the first
Republican-dominated Congress since the passage of the NLRA, it amended the
statute to sharply restrict the rights of workers to act collectively through
unions.97 And as labor has increasingly struggled in recent decades under this
amended regulatory regime, law has, in turn, increasingly been seen by scholars
as a tool of social control, blunting whatever transformative potential the labor
movement once had.98
The mechanisms by which law has been understood to bridle labor are
varied, but the basic theme is straightforward—in any number of ways, the state
has suppressed concerted activity that threatened capitalism. Criminal law made
unionization illegal in most places until as late as the 1930s.99 Injunctions against
strikes from the 1870s to 1932 (in federal courts), and even later (in state courts)
deterred activism, by forcing workers back to work.100 Lawyers for business in
the three decades after the adoption of the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 created
a framework for narrowing the permissible scope of worker collective action.101
Restrictions on picketing and boycotts deprived workers of the ability to form

RACE: THE MAKING OF HAWAII’S INTERRACIAL LABOR MOVEMENT 110–22 (2006) (recounting the history of
labor organizing in Hawai’i and explaining its eventual success in the 1940s as being in part due to enforcement
of Wagner Act).
95
See Pope, supra note 89, at 15–17.
96
61 Stat. 136 (1947); 29 U.S.C. §§ 141–188.
97
29 U.S.C. §§ 141–188.
98
As Jennifer Gordon summed it up, contemporary “discussions of the NLRA from the union perspective
are tinged with desperation about what law does for and to organizing[.]” Gordon, supra note 25, at 2; see Klare,
supra note 89, at 269–70.
99
See VICTORIA C. HATTAM, LABOR VISIONS AND STATE POWER: THE ORIGINS OF BUSINESS UNIONISM
IN THE UNITED STATES 30–75 (1993); Herbert Hovenkamp, Labor Conspiracies in American Law, 1880–1930,
66 TEX. L. REV. 919 (1988).
100
FELIX FRANKFURTER & NATHAN GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (photo reprint. 1963) (1930);
JOSIAH BARTLETT LAMBERT, “IF THE WORKERS TOOK A NOTION”: THE RIGHT TO STRIKE AND AMERICAN
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 43–44, 64–65 (2005). Later examples include James B. Atleson, The Legal
Community and the Transformation of Disputes: The Settlement of Injunction Actions, 23 LAW & SOC’Y REV.
41, 44–45 (1989), an empirical study of all cases between 1974 and 1979 in Buffalo, New York, in which
employers attempted to enjoin picketing. Id. at 48–51. Atleson found that the cases were resolved mainly through
negotiation. Id. Restrictions on picketing were imposed in a majority of cases and in the majority of those,
counsel for the union consented to the restriction (often because it appeared likely that the court would issue an
injunction). Id.
101
See DANIEL R. ERNST, LAWYERS AGAINST LABOR: FROM INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS TO CORPORATE
LIBERALISM 5–9 (1995); Sanjukta Paul, The Enduring Ambiguities of Antitrust Liability for Worker Collective
Action, 47 LOY. U. CHI. L.J 969, 1001–16 (2016).
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common cause with each other and with consumers and the public.102 Fines and
damages judgments against unions and their members under tort, criminal, and
antitrust law, and under the Taft-Hartley Act, were often devastating for workers
and their unions.103
Thus, the skeptical view is that even when law has ostensibly protected the
right of workers to act collectively, it has still constrained movement activism.
From this perspective, it was not just the Taft-Hartley Act’s regressive
amendments to the NLRA that were the problem for labor, it was the NLRA
getting in the way to begin with.104 Agency determinations of who could bargain
with whom over what foreclosed the possibility that labor might play a real role
in co-determining conditions of employment or in countering employers’ market
power.105 The eagerness of the NLRB and courts in the 1940s to impose the rule
of law on labor militance channeled labor activity into bargaining dominated by
union leadership at the expense of the rank and file.106 Labor’s social movement
activism was put on hold, both by law and by “voluntary” restraint of union
leaders who feared being deemed unpatriotic during World War II,107 and the
labor movement never recovered.
For labor law scholars, the once-provocative thesis that even the NLRA as
enacted was part of the problem has now become a consensus view.108 The
liberal legalism of the NLRA preserved rather than upended relations between

102
See, e.g., Dianne Avery, Images of Violence in Labor Jurisprudence: The Regulation of Picketing and
Boycotts, 1891–1921, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 32 (1989); Hiba Hafiz, Picketing in the New Economy, 39 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1845, 1849–51 (2018).
103
See, e.g., RICHARD A. BRISBIN, JR., A STRIKE LIKE NO OTHER STRIKE: LAW AND RESISTANCE DURING
THE PITTSTON COAL STRIKE OF 1989–1990, at 193–98 (2002); ERNST, supra note 101, at 149–55; AHMED WHITE,
THE LAST GREAT STRIKE: LITTLE STEEL, THE CIO, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR LABOR RIGHTS IN NEW DEAL
AMERICA 237 (2016).
104
See infra note 107 and accompanying text.
105
TOMLINS, supra note 38, at 132–40; Daniel R. Ernst, Common Laborers? Industrial Pluralists, Legal
Realists, and the Law of Industrial Disputes, 1915–1943, 11 LAW & HIST. REV. 59, 79–84 (1993).
106
See, e.g., Klare, supra note 89, at 290, 336; James Gray Pope, How American Workers Lost the Right
to Strike, and Other Tales, 103 MICH. L. REV. 518, 533–34 (2004); David M. Rabban, Has the NLRA Hurt
Labor?, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 407, 422–27 (1987).
107
See Klare, supra note 89, at 270 n.16; see also NELSON LICHTENSTEIN, LABOR’S WAR AT HOME: THE
CIO IN WORLD WAR II (2003) (discussing the role of World War II in diminishing the CIO’s movement activism
by institutionalizing union leadership and delegitimizing the activities of the rank and file).
108
See, e.g., Kate Andrias, The New Labor Law, 126 YALE L.J. 2, 5–6, 13–17 (2016); Cynthia L. Estlund,
Labor, Property, and Sovereignty After Lechmere, 46 STAN. L. REV. 305, 307 (1994); Benjamin I. Sachs, Labor
Law Renewal, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 375, 375 (2007); Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers’
Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1776–77 (1983).
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labor and capital,109 and the Taft-Hartley Act was just the nail in the coffin rather
than the mortal blow.
And yet, it is worth asking whether this should be the end of the story. Below
we argue that the elision of labor within law and social movements scholarship
can be seen to have limited the theoretical horizons of that field. But for scholars
who seek to understand the American labor movement, the failure to consider
labor as one movement among many may have been limiting too. For labor law
scholars, labor has often been seen as sui generis, as a movement which must be
understood on its own terms. A strand of law and social movements scholarship,
having failed to consider the struggles of organized labor, may be too optimistic
about law’s possibilities. On the other hand, a strand of labor law scholarship
may have too bleak an assessment of law.110 One ongoing critique of the
American labor movement is that it has been overly suspicious of state power
and law, and too confident about what it could accomplish solely through private
ordering.111 If this critique is correct, labor’s historical resistance to using public
law as a resource may itself be constitutive of American exceptionalism.
2. Lawyering for the Labor Movement
The labor law literature has devoted less attention to the role of lawyers than

109
SCHILLER, supra note 47, at 83–86; Stone, supra note 89, at 1516–17 (arguing that labor law “serves
as a vehicle for the manipulation of employee discontent and for the legitimation of existing inequalities of
power in the workplace”).
110
Many law and social movements scholars have been highly critical of law’s possibilities. See, e.g.,
Sandra R. Levitsky, To Lead with Law: Reassessing the Influence of Legal Advocacy Organizations in Social
Movements, in CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, supra note 35, at 145, 158–59 (listing numerous
arguments within the literature which question the value of law as a mechanism for achieving social change).
Conversely, many labor scholars see potential value in the law. See Gordon, supra note 25, at 68, 68–71
(describing a cycle in which sometimes law presents opportunities and sometimes it is an “albatross” around the
neck of labor); Michael H. Gottesman, In Despair, Starting Over: Imagining a Labor Law for Unorganized
Workers, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 59, 68–96 (1993) (proposing changes to labor law that would empower workers).
Scholars other than labor lawyers likewise suggest a range of possibilities for the role of law in the labor
movement. See RISA L. GOLUBOFF, THE LOST PROMISE OF CIVIL RIGHTS 16–17 (2007) (explaining that in the
1940s, courts were poised to afford collective labor rights a central importance in civil rights); Robin Stryker,
Half Empty, Half Full, or Neither: Law, Inequality, and Social Change in Capitalist Democracies, 3 Ann. Rev.
L. & Soc. Sci. 69, 74 (2007) (noting that under the Wagner Act, increased labor militancy was associated with
gains in membership for the first and only time, suggesting that law increased the power of labor movement
activism in ways it had not experienced before, and has not experienced since, the Taft-Hartley amendments).
Yet, on the whole, the law and social movements literature has tended to see more hope in law than the labor
law literature.
111
See, e.g., Mark Barenberg, The Political Economy of the Wagner Act: Power, Symbol, and Workplace
Cooperation, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1379, 1394 (1993) (noting that a “deep-seated ideological unwillingness to
embrace aggressive government intervention in labor relations debilitated organized labor as much as its
diminishing size and its failure to achieve prominence in a partisan coalition”).
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the literature on law and social movements. Because of the importance of
lawyers to our case study, we briefly summarize what is known about labor
lawyers here.
Labor lawyers were among the earliest cause lawyers, although they have
rarely been recognized as such.112 Labor lawyers were drawn to the labor
movement because of their commitment to the cause, too.113 But consistent with
labor’s experience of law as a constraint imposed upon them, these lawyers
largely did not litigate to establish new rights.114 To be sure, some of their work
involved enforcing statutory or contractual protections, and occasionally
protecting movement members from civil or criminal liability for activism.115
But a major part of their role was to help the organizations comply with onerous
legal requirements and defend the organizations when their members’ activism
transgressed specified legal boundaries.116
Some of these lawyers were an important yet neglected part of the apparatus
by which courts and the NLRB restrained labor activism. As Katherine Stone,
Reuel Schiller, and others have explained, these attorneys imposed a pluralist
vision that treated labor and management as interest groups whose bargains
would be enforced; yet, the law denied many substantive rights to labor, all the
while leaving corporate power untouched.117 When law required arbitration and
limited strikes, picketing, and boycotts, the apparatus of industrial pluralism put
even radical labor lawyers in the position of being cops in disciplining
movement activism.118 Exactly how law and lawyers did this is best understood
through archival analysis. We do so in Part II.119

112
See, e.g., JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN
AMERICA 217–20 (1976); Robert W. Gordon, The American Legal Profession, 1870–2000, in 3 THE CAMBRIDGE
HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA 106–08 (Michael Grossberg & Christopher Tomlins eds., 2008) (identifying labor
lawyers during the New Deal as “cause lawyers” with “commitments to social reform”); William E. Forbath,
Class Struggle, Group Rights, and Socialist Pluralism on the Lower East Side—Radical Lawyering and
Constitutional Imagination in the Early Twentieth Century 18–19 (Pub. L. & Legal Theory Rsch. Paper Series,
No. 712, 2019), www.ssrn.com/ssrn-id=3485241.
113
Gordon, supra note 112, at 107.
114
Id.
115
Id.
116
Id.
117
SCHILLER, supra note 47, at 19–22; Stone, supra note 89, at 1513–14.
118
See Robert L. Nelson & Laura Beth Nielsen, Cops, Counsel, and Entrepreneurs: Constructing the Role
of Inside Counsel in Large Corporations, 34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 457 (2000) (asserting that lawyers inside
corporations conceptualize their role in one or more of three ways, as cops policing the conduct of their clients,
as counsel advising their clients, and as entrepreneurs aiding their clients achieve business goals).
119
One of the advantages of a historical approach to analyzing the role of lawyers in movement work is
that it enables examination of attorney-client communications, something that is rarely possible for more
contemporaneous movement activity. In the course of one of the many conversations between ILWU staff and
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C. Five Dimensions of Law and Social Movements Studies
In this section, we turn to a brief survey of the law and social movements
literature, emphasizing five dimensions in which refocusing on labor has the
potential to be most productive. Our survey aims neither at comprehensiveness,
nor at critique, but at identifying those conversations in which organized labor
adds something to the story.
1. Where Law and Movements Intersect
Arguably the most defining feature of law and social movements scholarship
is its emphasis on the ways in which movements proactively engage with the
law. As the leading association of law and social movements scholars introduces
the field: “Social movements use a wide variety of legal strategies—including
litigation, lobbying, and administrative advocacy—in their programs for social
change . . . . [M]ovements rely on rights to frame their grievances, to generate
and circulate collective identity, and to recruit and mobilize activists.”120 In other
words, movements engage in what scholars call “legal mobilization.”121
Consistent with this vision, Lani Guinier and Gerald Torres frame the study
of law and social movements as “demosprudence.”122 Demosprudence, they
argue, describes “the ways that ongoing collective action by ordinary people can
permanently alter the practice of democracy by changing the people who make
the law and the landscape in which that law is made.”123 Through mobilizing
law, movements create social change.
The literature is not always sanguine about the consequences of movements
invoking law. In fact, the literature is often quite critical of law’s potential as a

their attorneys during the mid-century dispute we detail below, ILWU staff remarked on the importance of
attorney-client confidentiality: “You will bear in mind, I am sure, the possible use which an employer or a court
could make of this letter if it fell into their hands.” Letter from Lincoln Fairley, Research Director, ILWU, to
Allan Brotsky, Attorney, Gladstein, Andersen, Resner & Leonard (Feb. 5, 1951) (on file with the Labor and
Archives and Research Center). Historical distance enables examination of these kinds of communications, and
more granular study of how lawyering changes movements.
120
See Collaborative Research Networks, supra note 51 (emphasis added).
121
“Legal mobilization” is a term that has been subject to “conceptual slippage” in its diverse uses. Emilio
Lehoucq & Whitney K. Taylor, Conceptualizing Legal Mobilization: How Should We Understand the
Deployment of Legal Strategies?, 45 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 166, 168 (2020); see also Lisa Vanhala, Legal
Mobilization, OXFORD BIBLIOGRAPHIES IN POLITICAL SCIENCE, https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/
document/obo-9780199756223/obo-9780199756223-0031.xml# (last updated Feb. 22, 2018). Here, we use the
term in a broad sense, to refer to movements’ strategic use of law, broadly conceived, including formal legal
claims, as well as “legal norms, discourse, [and] symbols.” Vanhala, supra.
122
Guinier & Torres, supra note 86, at 2749–56.
123
Id. at 2750.
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tool of social transformation. As the title of Rosenberg’s famous inquiry, The
Hollow Hope, suggests, much compelling research contends that legal change
may not always result in the social change movements desire.124 Similarly,
socio-legal scholars have emphasized that there are a host of downsides for
movements that use law as a tactic in order to achieve extra-legal goals.125
Notably, the description of the field set forth above concludes with the caveat
that “law and legal strategies can exert a conservative influence on social
movements, channeling protest and more radical forms of action into
conventional political institutions.”126 There is, accordingly, much in the
literature that suggests movements should not focus so much on either law
reform or litigation. Yet, descriptively, the literature still suggests they do.127
Less emphasized, then, are the ways in which law is imposed on movements,
or how and why movements eschew law. This theme has often been relegated to
a separate body of scholarship—the study of law and authoritarian states.128 But,
as some of the classic exceptions to this taxonomy illustrate, law is used as a
form of social control in democratic regimes as well. For example, in his nowclassic work, Steven Barkan complicates the prevailing narrative of the role of
law within the civil rights movement, arguing that “the legal system proved a
mixed blessing,”129 because at the same time that federal courts were providing
some formal redress, the “entire legal machinery of the South” was also being
deployed to repress movement activity.130 Similarly, Luis Fernandez’s account
of social control of the anti-globalization movement in the United States found
local regulation an effective means of quelling protests.131 Michael McCann and

124
See generally GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL
CHANGE? (1991) (discussing the limited success of courts in producing significant social reform in a variety of
areas, including civil rights, abortion rights, and women’s rights, among others).
125
See, e.g., Gwendolyn M. Leachman, Protest to Perry: How Litigation Shaped the LGBT Movement’s
Agenda, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1667 (2014).
126
See Collaborative Research Networks, supra note 51.
127
Making this assumption explicit, Ed Rubin states, “[w]hile there are probably social movements that
ignore the political sphere—one example that comes to mind is Trekkies—the great majority . . . are deeply
committed to law reform.” See Rubin, supra note 36, at 51.
128
For a review of this literature, see Lynette J. Chua, Legal Mobilization and Authoritarianism, 15 ANN.
REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 355 (2019).
129
Steven E. Barkan, Legal Control of the Southern Civil Rights Movement, 49 AM. SOCIO. REV. 552, 554
(1984).
130
Id. at 554–59.
131
LUIS A. FERNANDEZ, POLICING DISSENT: SOCIAL CONTROL AND THE ANTI-GLOBALIZATION
MOVEMENT 68–91 (2008). Elsewhere, we also note that Kim Voss’s classic work on the decline of the Knights
of Labor also shows how law is imposed on movements using the example of the systematic and effective efforts
to use law to exterminate the radical Knights of Labor in the nineteenth century. Voss, supra note 24.
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George Lovell also emphasize the repressive aspects of law that govern lowwage work and workers.132
Yet, these pieces are still the exception. And few canonical pieces begin with
where labor started and ultimately landed, thinking about law as a tool imposed
on popular agitation, as something to be avoided. Nor is it common to consider
whether or why certain movements have chosen not to prioritize legal change
and have, in fact, sought to avoid engagement with law.133
The literature’s emphasis on movements that seek legal change (and
particularly on those that do so in courts) has contributed to corollary
assumptions which shape the field—that social movements tend to advance
minoritarian causes rather than majoritarian ones, and that they turn to law as a
corrective to failed political processes.134 Again, to quote Guinier and Torres,
“movements are one way that minorities in a majoritarian democracy protect
their rights . . . [S]ocial movements enable those who are shut out of a
majoritarian political process to nonetheless open up nodes in the decisionmaking practices of a democratic society.”135
There is a neatness in understanding the scope of the law and social
movements inquiry to be primarily about the relationship between courts and
minority groups. Consistent with the Carolene Products answer to the countermajoritarian difficulty, this paradigm imagines that social movements come
before the court when the electoral process fails them.136 Under these specific
circumstances, it is legitimate for courts to make policy.137 Yet, the relationship
between law and social movements is often not so neat. Many movements claim

132
MCCANN & LOVELL, supra note 87; see George I. Lovell, Michael McCann & Kirstine Taylor,
Covering Legal Mobilization: A Bottom Up Analysis of Wards Cove v. Atonio, 41 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 61, 81–
88 (2016).
133
The literature on marriage equality considers at some length the debates among movement activists
over whether to prioritize litigation or legislation to establish recognition of same sex marriages as opposed to
other goals. See, e.g., Nan D. Hunter, Varieties of Constitutional Experience: Democracy and the Marriage
Equality Campaign, 64 UCLA L. REV. 1662 (2017).
134
Because these assumptions tend to be unstated, the definition of a “minoritarian” movement can itself
be unspecified. Historically and theoretically, the meaning of a “minority” movement is contested and tends to
be based to some extent on actual numbers and to some extent on political power.
135
See Guinier & Torres, supra note 86, at 2756–57.
136
In United States v. Carolene Products Co., the Supreme Court set forth a new logic of judicial review,
emphasizing that the judicial branch would largely defer to the political branches when it came to economic
regulation, but would be more likely to intervene when majoritarian processes harmed minorities or infringed
on fundamental rights. 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 n.4 (1938).
137
See Cummings, Turn, supra note 33, at 362–63 (arguing that minoritarian social movements convince
the broader public, thereby allowing courts to adopt new judicial interpretations of the law, which are consistent
with majoritarianism).
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to speak on behalf of, or at least for the benefit of, majorities; and many
movements consider both political and judicial mobilization to be part of their
tactical tool kits.
One further consequence of the legal change and minoritarian assumptions
of the field is that there tends to be a disproportionate focus, especially by legal
scholars, on constitutional claims-making. William Eskridge, for instance,
writes about how “identity-based social movements” revolutionized
constitutional law in the latter half of the twentieth century.138 With fidelity to
the Carolene Products framework, he argues that “courts were a natural forum
for politically marginalized minorities to resist their subordination.”139 He
continues, “[f]or each [group], the social movement’s political arguments were
translated into constitutional arguments.”140 Similarly, Guinier and Torres
contend that “social movements challenge, and, if successful, change governing
norms, creating an alternative narrative of constitutional meaning.”141 All of
that is true. As we discuss in Part III, however, this vision of social movements
overlooks movements—like labor—that have long worried that constitutional
claims offered more peril than promise.142
2. What a Movement Looks Like
A second tendency in the literature has been to conceptualize movements as
non-institutional. This is, to some extent, a threshold definitional issue, and one
of the reasons why labor has long been excluded from the field.143 For instance,
Charles Tilly’s classic definition of a social movement is “[a] sustained series of

138
See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on
Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062, 2071 (2002) (positing that the expansion
of constitutionally-protected individual rights was the result of identity-based social movements, including the
civil rights movement, the women’s rights movement, and the gay rights movement).
139
Id. at 2070.
140
Id. at 2071 (emphasis added).
141
Guinier & Torres, supra note 86, at 2757 (emphasis added).
142
See Andrias, supra note 108, at 83–84, 84 n.400; Laura Weinrib, The Right to Work and the Right to
Strike, 2017 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 513, 527 (observing that “[i]n many respects, the First Amendment strategy for
advancing labor’s rights was a risky one”); infra Part III.
143
There is a similar debate in broader social movement literature about the extent to which social
movements can be organized and institutionalized. See, e.g., McCarthy & Zald, supra note 44, at 1236–38. While
some scholars contend that social movements are at most “loosely organized,” others have a more capacious
understanding of social movements, which includes social movement organizations. But see Doug McAdam,
Tactical Innovation and the Pace of Insurgency, 48 AM. SOCIO. REV. 735, 736–37 n.4 (1983). Some scholars
argue that social movements become more formal and institutionalized as they age. Suzanne Staggenborg, The
Consequences of Professionalization and Formalization in the Pro-Choice Movement, 53 AM. SOC. REV. 585,
598, 604 (1988). While labor’s institutionalization is partly the product of the age of many unions, it is also a
result of labor’s distinct relationship with state power.
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interactions between power-holders and persons successfully claiming to speak
on behalf of a constituency lacking formal representation.”144 Similarly, Guinier
and Torres define social movements as “those who were not part of the ‘consent
community’ and who challenge the legitimacy of those rules that flowed from
the period of their exclusion or those rules that continue to exclude them.”145
Social movements are groups insufficiently institutionalized to have a seat at the
table.146
This conceptualization frames social movements as having a specific
relationship with power—challenging those who have it, not necessarily
wielding it themselves. Movements make claims, whether legal, political, or
cultural, against power-holders, but they do not become power-holders. As a
result, the literature has focused less than it might on the trade-offs entailed in
choosing among various organizational forms of, and paths to, institutional
power. Moreover, it has devoted little attention to the private and public law
mechanisms that regulate how institutionalized movements operate.147
Again, there are exceptions to these generalizations. Some scholars have
studied how different social movements take different forms, each with specific
advantages and disadvantages. For instance, Luis Fernandez discusses the ways
in which the non-institutionalized nature of the anti-globalization movement
allowed it to evade some forms of state control, while making it uniquely
susceptible to others.148 At the other end of the spectrum, Catherine Albiston and
Laura Beth Nielsen have shown how the funding of public interest law
organizations—and by implication, an institutional structure reliant on such
funding—shapes the substance and scope of their reform agendas.149
144
Charles Tilly, Social Movements and National Politics, in STATEMAKING AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
297, 306 (Charles Bright & Susan Harding eds., 1984) (emphasis added).
145
Guinier & Torres, supra note 86, at 2751 (emphasis added).
146
Id.
147
Reva Siegel has argued that one characteristic of social movements is that they lack public
accountability. See Reva Siegel, The Jurisgenerative Role of Social Movements in United States Constitutional
Law 14 (2014) (available at https://law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/documents/pdf/Faculty/Siegel_
Jurisgenerative_Role_of_Social_Movements.pdf). While such line-drawing helps distinguish social movements
from political representatives, we think it overly simplifies the regulatory context in which labor unions and
other social movements exist. There are a number of statutory, common law, and constitutional law doctrines
which are designed to ensure “public accountability” by social movement organizations, and consistent with our
argument about the role of law in channeling movement activity, we think those merit greater study as well.
148
FERNANDEZ, supra note 131.
149
Catherine R. Albiston & Laura Beth Nielsen, Funding the Cause: How Public Interest Law
Organizations Fund Their Activities and Why It Matters for Social Change, 39 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 62, 88–92
(2014); see also Megan Ming Francis, The Price of Civil Rights: Black Lives, White Funding, and Movement
Capture, 53 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 275, 305–06 (2019) (discussing movement capture of the NAACP by the
Garland Fund).
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Importantly, both pieces find that organizational form matters a great deal for
how social movements experience law.150
And yet, even these pieces do not fully help theorize labor’s experience.
Labor has often been treated differently than other movements precisely because
of its institutionalization—because rather than making claims against powerholders, it has often sought primarily to be left alone, to exercise power
independently of the state. Bringing labor back into the conversation allows for
greater theorization of the trade-offs social movements face in negotiating their
relationships with power.
3. The Role of Lawyers
A third emphasis within the literature on social movements, cause lawyers,
and social change has been on the ways in which lawyers come to dominate
movements. Gwendolyn Leachman sums up this bent in the literature as follows:
“Movement lawyers, the argument goes, dominate the attorney-client
relationship in their pursuit of impact litigation, substituting their own legal
priorities for the more radical goals of their activist clients.”151 Most scholars are
critical of the domineering lawyer, or, at minimum, concerned about the ways
in which lawyer leadership disempowers other movement actors.152 At the same
time, scholars also recognize that lawyers can be effective in organizing
campaigns, mobilizing people, and achieving real change on the ground.153

150

FERNANDEZ, supra note 131; Albiston & Nielsen, supra note 149.
Leachman, supra note 125, at 1669.
152
See Sarat & Scheingold, supra note 35, at 3–4, 6–7.
153
In addition to Leachman’s nuanced approach following the quote, see Leachman, supra note 125, at
1669, McCann has also recognized that lawyers can be empowering to movements. MCCANN, supra note 25, at
292 (noting the ways lawyers empowered the pay equity movement). As McCann and Silverstein powerfully
summed up the criticism, before going on to challenge it, lawyers, animated by a belief in the power of rights
and their own career goals, “tend to infuse movements with the misleading and mythical promise of legal
justice,” which “can crowd out alternative substantive agendas, organizational approaches, and tactical actions.”
Michael McCann & Helena Silverstein, Rethinking Law’s “Allurements”: A Relational Analysis of Social
Movement Lawyers in the United States, in CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITIES 261, 263 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 1998). But it is important to note that
McCann and others have shown that lawyers are diverse in their relationships and contributions to movements
and have played significant roles in facilitating movement activism. See, e.g., id. at 286–87. Scott Cummings
also has studied ways in which lawyers contributed powerfully to transformative struggles for equality without
dominating movements. CUMMINGS, supra note 87. Cummings has theorized “movement liberalism”: whether
or how lawyers can assist social movements to “mobilize dissent in order to shift politics and culture, thereby
producing changes in law that reflect and codify social movement goals.” Cummings, Puzzle, supra note 33, at
1559; see Cummings, Turn, supra note 33, at 363–65, 382–91, 403–05.
151
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The primary way in which lawyers have been shown to dominate movements
is by reshaping movement strategy around legal goals. Lawyers theorize
grievances as rights claims. Lawyers may also be on the defensive, since
“mobilization from below begets counter-mobilization from above,”154 and
lawyers must defend past wins against efforts to roll back legal advances. But
even the literature on backlash generally still portrays social movement lawyers
as movement entrepreneurs, shaping movement strategy.155 Even when studying
how lawyers defend protesters against criminal charges or civil claims, scholars
emphasize how skillful lawyering can mobilize activists and engender public
support.156
Collectively, these portrayals of lawyers suggest their skill and political
commitments shape outcomes for clients. Given this, the legal obligations these
lawyers owe to clients are theorized primarily as a matter of movement
strategy,157 of networks and efficacy,158 or of professional responsibility.159
The role that movement lawyers play in assisting social movements in
avoiding the at-times drastic consequences of running afoul of the law has been
far less studied. As we discuss in Part III below, labor unions became large
institutions in the 1930s; collectively, they had millions of dues-paying
members.160 They had detailed and comprehensive contractual and statutory
rights and responsibilities vis-à-vis the employees they represented, their
154

Stryker, supra note 110, at 87.
See Scott L. Cummings, Rethinking Foundational Critiques of Lawyers in Social Movements, 85
FORDHAM L. REV. 1987, 2005–14 (2017) (summarizing the literature on backlash, especially as it relates to
lawyer dominance). An earlier and foundational work explaining why lawyers contribute to the resistance to
progressive change is Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculation on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 149–51 (1974).
156
See, e.g., Randall Kennedy, Martin Luther King’s Constitution: A Legal History of the Montgomery
Bus Boycott, 98 YALE L.J. 999 (1989). Kennedy and other scholars of the bus boycott found litigation to be key
to its success. See Robert Jerome Glennon, The Role of Law in the Civil Rights Movement: The Montgomery Bus
Boycott, 1955–1957, 9 LAW & HIST. REV. 59 (1991).
157
See, e.g., Betty Hung, Essay—Law and Organizing from the Perspective of Organizers: Finding a
Shared Theory of Social Change, 1 L.A. PUB. INT. L.J. 4, 23–30 (2009) (articulating an approach to being an
effective lawyer for a social justice organization).
158
ANN SOUTHWORTH, LAWYERS OF THE RIGHT: PROFESSIONALIZING THE CONSERVATIVE COALITION
124–48 (2008).
159
The classic in this vein is Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client
Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976). More recent works exploring the issues
of cause or movement lawyer accountability include Scott L. Cummings, The Accountability Problem in Public
Interest Practice: Old Paradigms and New Directions, in LAWYERS IN PRACTICE: ETHICAL DECISION MAKING
IN CONTEXT 340 (Leslie C. Levin & Lynn Mather eds., 2012); Kevin C. McMunigal, Of Causes and Clients:
Two Tales of Roe v. Wade, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 779 (1996); Ann Southworth, Collective Representation for the
Disadvantaged: Variations in Problems of Accountability, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2449 (1999).
160
See infra Part III.A.2.
155

FISKREDDYPROOFS_9.30.20

2020]

PROTECTION BY LAW, REPRESSION BY LAW

9/30/2020 12:01 PM

93

members, and employers.161 And, both by choice and by statutory command,
they had more-or-less democratic mechanisms of internal governance.162
Lawyers did not lead the labor movement. But they did take on an increasingly
important role in it because their clients had to navigate a complex legal regime,
and the consequences of a legal misstep could be—as in the case of Juneau
Spruce—massive. The ways in which labor law conscripted lawyers into these
roles as a matter of professional obligation is a missed opportunity to understand
how lawyers impact movements.163
4. The Mechanisms of Social Change
A fourth dimension of the field emphasizes the “constitutive” effects of law.
As socio-legal scholar Robin Stryker aptly sums up the literature, most scholars
now believe “law’s constitutive power trumps its instrumental power.”164
The constitutive effects of law can be broadly understood as its “cultural”
effects—the ways in which legal claims-making alters legal consciousness,
collective identity, and individuals’ and movements’ sense of efficacy.165
Material or instrumental effects, by contrast, are the more immediate,
empirically observable effects of law, such as legally-compelled redistributions
of wealth or changes of behavior.166 Michael McCann’s classic, Rights at Work,
is commonly seen as reorienting the field around a constitutive view of how law
creates social change.167
161

See infra Part III.A.2.
Under the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, union members have the right to equal
treatment, to free speech and assembly, to run for union office, to approve dues increases through direct votes
or delegate conventions, to due process in hearings that might affect the member’s status as a union member,
and to be free from retaliation for exercising rights under the statute. 29 U.S.C. §§ 411, 481, 529 (2018). Unions
are required to hold leadership elections, by secret ballot, every three, four, or five years depending on the type
of union, and they are permitted to impose only reasonable requirements on eligibility to run for union office.
Id. at § 481.The statute prohibits use of union or employer funds to support candidates for union office and
requires unions to mail candidates’ literature to union members at the candidates’ expense. Id.
163
For example, in the labor movement, labor lawyers wrote entire handbooks aimed at other lawyers and
union organizers to help them navigate the legal constraints on union organizing. See STEPHEN I. SCHLOSSBERG
& JUDITH A. SCOTT, ORGANIZING AND THE LAW (3d ed. 1983).
164
Stryker, supra note 110, at 75.
165
See McCann, supra note 24, at 21–22 (distinguishing between instrumentalists/positivists who “tend
to identify law primarily in instrumental, determinate, positivist terms . . . [and the extent] that official
institutional actions cause direct, immediate, tangible effects on targeted behaviors” and the
constitutive/interpretive perspective in which “attention is directed to how legal discourses and symbols intersect
with and are expressive of broader ideological formations . . . [and] legal conventions are understood as a quite
plastic and malleable medium, routinely employed to reconfigure relations, redefine entitlements, and formulate
aspirations for collective living”).
166
Id.
167
MCCANN, supra note 25.
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Published in 1994, McCann wrote largely in dialogue with Rosenberg’s The
Hollow Hope, the then-dominant book in the field.168 Rosenberg’s core
argument was that the legal victories of the civil rights movement had not
resulted in the social change movement activists sought; as a result, he believed
that legal scholars should be less optimistic about courts as a vector of social
change.169 In response, McCann argued that Rosenberg’s measure of social
change was too narrow.170 He pointed out, quite rightly, that social change can
be seen not only in immediate legal change, but also in terms of building
movements, in the ability of activists to compel formal policy concessions
through negotiation, and through “a general moral discourse” and “ongoing
challenges to status quo power relations.”171 According to Scott Cummings,
“[t]he immediate impact of McCann’s intervention was to frame the new law
and social movements field precisely around a constitutive view of law, in which
lawyers and courts were de-centered—a view that affected the methodological
focus and the kinds of campaigns that those who followed would study.”172
The focus on constitutive effects was much needed at the time. Law is
undeniably a discursive and symbolic realm of contestation, in addition to a
material one, and to focus only on the narrow, instrumental impact of law—what
a court’s judgment concretely yields—is to miss much of the story. Yet, there is
a concern that the field may have swung too far in the other direction. For
instance, Doug NeJaime correctly argues that litigation loss may be a victory
from a constitutive perspective.173 It can help movements solidify their sense of
collective identity.174 It can increase attention to an issue.175 And it can increase
financial support.176 But, as Catherine Albiston has argued, this is far from a
universal truth.177 While new and insurgent movements may find legal
mobilization useful, win, lose, or draw, established movements with limited
resources may have reason to be quite concerned about the material impact of
law.178 The pre-Wagner Act history of strikes crushed and unions destroyed by
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Id. at 136 n.35.
ROSENBERG, supra note 124, at 336–43.
170
See MCCANN, supra note 25, at 290–93.
171
Id. at 279–81.
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Cummings, Turn, supra note 33, at 380.
173
Doulas NeJaime, Winning Through Losing, 96 IOWA L. REV. 941, 969 (2011).
174
Id.
175
Id.
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Id.
177
Catherine Albiston, The Dark Side of Litigation as a Social Movement Strategy, 96 IOWA L. REV. BULL.
61, 69–71 (2011).
178
Id. at 74–77.
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sweeping injunctions and staggering damages judgments reminds us that
litigation loss can also shatter a movement.179
Moreover, as Albiston also highlights, the literature often treats the
constitutive effects of law as inherently positive, as a “catalyst” to movement
mobilization.180 But the cultural impact of law can harm movements as much as
benefit them—a legal win can cause complacency; a legal loss can cause
hopelessness. In making this argument, Albiston specifically emphasizes labor,
and the ways in which the legacy of repression in the late 1800s and early 1900s
caused the labor movement to be uniquely wary of public law.181 Citing Forbath,
she concludes, “the movement’s interactions with the courts, including its own
litigation strategies, constituted its identity and its understanding of itself in ways
that deradicalized what it means to be a labor movement in America.”182
McCann and Lovell, too, have shown the ways in which repressive judicial
rulings, along with discriminatory enforcement of criminal law, squelched a
radical movement of Filipino migrant activists, who were challenging racial
segregation and abusive working conditions in fish processing plants. As a result
of their legal losses, many turned away from activism entirely.183
Labor’s long history with law—over periods of gain and loss, material and
constitutive—is a reminder that law operates in multiple arenas at the same time.
This history counsels against over-emphasis on one pathway or one type of
outcome. As Elizabeth Gurley Flynn suggested, there is both protection and
repression by law, often simultaneously.184
5. The Rights Debate
One final dimension of the literature concerns the conceptualization of
rights. For decades, law and social movements scholars have sought to
understand whether the discourse of rights can be empowering for social
movements and marginalized communities.185 This conversation focuses on the
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ERNST, supra note 101, at 149–55; Voss, supra note 24.
Albiston, supra note 177, at 63, 65 (“Symbolic/strategic proponents are generally more positive about
law and litigation . . . Constitutive changes of the negative, internal variety . . . are not addressed in the literature
in the same detail . . . Most scholars seem to assume that changes to collective identity and oppositional
consciousness are, by definition, positive.”).
181
Id. at 75.
182
Id.
183
MCCANN & LOVELL, supra note 87.
184
Flynn, supra note *.
185
See, e.g., Amy Bartholomew & Alan Hunt, What’s Wrong with Rights?, 9 LAW & INEQ. 1 (1990).
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symbolic value of “rights talk,” and the merits of framing movement goals as
“rights.”186
During the 1980s and early 1990s, critical legal scholars and critical race
scholars helped to define the parameters of this conversation. From the canonical
critical legal studies perspective, Mark Tushnet insisted that rights discourse was
too indeterminate, unstable, and abstract to further people’s real, on-the-ground
needs.187 Given the anti-state, formalist origin of rights ideology, it could not be
a progressive discourse, since for every rights-based argument advanced by
liberals and progressives, conservatives would be able to advance a more
resonant, historically-supported, counter-rights argument.188
In powerful rejoinders, critical race scholars argued that rights rhetoric had
been too meaningful to those historically without rights to be abandoned.189 In
the words of Patricia Williams, “[f]or the historically disempowered, the
conferring of rights is symbolic of all the denied aspects of their humanity; rights
imply a respect that places one in the referential range of self and others, that
elevates one’s status from human body to social being.”190 While acknowledging
that the discursive invocation of rights may not itself create systematic change,
she argued that it was still uniquely empowering to communities seeking
change—and from a constitutive perspective, that itself was a form of social
change.191
Both of these perspectives yield important insights into the potential
advantages and disadvantages of rights rhetoric writ large. Yet on both sides, the
claims have at times been relatively undifferentiated—either all rights talk is
hollow or all rights talk is empowering, with some scholars suggesting that rights
need not be tethered to doctrine or discourse at all.192 As a result, there has been
186
As Gwendolyn Leachman explains in her work on legal framing, “[s]ocio-legal scholars conceptualize
law broadly as both a cultural construct and a symbolic resource . . . and emphasize that informal articulations
of the law may be only minimally constrained by official legal formulations.” Gwendolyn Leachman, Legal
Framing, 61 STUD. L., POL., & SOC’Y 25, 27 (2013).
187
Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363, 1363–64 (1984).
188
Id. at 1364.
189
See, e.g., Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401, 414–16 (1987). Defense of the historical importance of rights as a discursive
framework is not limited to critical race scholars. In particular, historians have noted that rights are significant
statements of aspirations. See Hendrik Hartog, The Constitution of Aspiration and ‘the Rights That Belong to Us
All’, 74 J. AM. HIST. 1013 (1987).
190
Id. at 416; see Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and
Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988); Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the
Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparation, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 329–30 (1987).
191
Williams, supra note 189, at 431.
192
See Francesca Poletta, The Structural Context of Novel Rights Claims: Southern Civil Rights
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comparatively less attention to which rights claims have been effective, for
which groups, under which circumstances, and for which purposes.
To be sure, many scholars have drawn lines connecting legal doctrine to
broader rights discourse to show that the efficacy of rights talk will depend on
the right at issue, the extent to which it has been part of a recognized discourse
of rights, and the extent to which it is grounded in foundational rights-granting
documents.193 As Bartholomew and Hunt have argued, “[r]ights discourses,
whilst open-ended, do exhibit some structure in that their content is almost
always located in proximity to the discourses of law, involving claims to
entitlements that take a form capable of protection and advancement by and
through legal action.”194 And, in this vein, Tushnet conceded that his argument
was more about the efficacy of positive rights (e.g., to food and shelter) than
negative rights (e.g., to be free from government restraint): “the predominance
of negative rights,” he argued, “creates an ideological barrier to the extension of
positive rights in our culture.”195 And yet, these nuances have not always been
emphasized within the broader theoretical debates.
Organized labor has long struggled with the question of rights rhetoric, in
part because the kinds of rights that would do the most work for labor—rights
to association and mutual aid and solidarity in the workplace, to shared
governance of workplaces and enterprises, and to some substantive standard of
economic well-being, through wealth and power redistribution—are outside the
doctrinal and discursive foundations for rights in the United States.196 As such,
to engage with the experiences of organized labor is to invite a more nuanced
approach to the power of rights talk.
***
Collectively, these five dimensions of the literature describe the experiences
of many social movements at many points in time. As we argue in Part III, they
tend to reflect one model of a social movement interacting with law, a model
largely rooted in the civil rights movement’s unprecedented legal victories midcentury and the impact of those victories on legal theory and popular legal
consciousness. This model is important and eminently worthy of scholarly
Organizing, 1961–1966, 34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 367, 368–69 (2000).
193
See, e.g., EMILY ZACKIN, LOOKING FOR RIGHTS IN ALL THE WRONG PLACES: WHY STATE
CONSTITUTIONS CONTAIN AMERICA’S POSITIVE RIGHTS 197 (2013) (noting the absence of positive rights in
federal constitutional protections, but their relatively greater presence in state constitutions).
194
Bartholomew & Hunt, supra note 185, at 7.
195
Tushnet, supra note 187, at 1393.
196
See Kate Andrias, Building Labor’s Constitution, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1591, 1592–95 (2016).
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attention. But it is not the only model. Through our case study from a movement
whose relationship with law has taken a distinct path, we seek to emphasize the
socio-historic specificity of each.
Below, we tell the legal history of the first significant federal damages
judgment against a labor union since Congress legalized the labor movement in
the 1930s. It is also a story of how a union and its lawyers struggled to resist the
movement restraining aspects of the Taft-Hartley Act. Taft-Hartley outlawed the
tactics—picketing, strikes, boycotts, and political activity—that workers had
used in the 1930s to organize unions and to exert collective power. In the story
of Juneau Spruce, what seemed to local union leaders to be an ordinary labor
dispute about an employer’s breach of a collective bargaining agreement wound
up as an enormous damages judgment—one so large it could bankrupt the entire
international union. Employer organizations sought to use the judgment to undo
one of labor’s biggest organizing wins since the 1930s—the successful
unionization of the entire agricultural workforce of Hawai’i.
The Taft-Hartley Act rendered movement activism dangerous by subjecting
it to injunctions and the threat of ruinous liability. Through detailed archival
analysis, we show that the effect of law on the movement was not merely a court
order to stop protesting or to pay money. More subtly, but perhaps more
powerfully, the new law put union lawyers in the position of policing their
client’s activism in order to save the union, as an institution, from liability for
the activism of the rank and file.
To understand how law shapes social movements, we argue, one must look
closely at how the labor movement experienced law. And, for the reasons we
detail below, the story of Juneau Spruce is an ideal place to look.
II. THE STORY OF JUNEAU SPRUCE
Emergent labor unions spent the late nineteenth century and the first three
decades of the twentieth fighting for the right to operate free of state repression.
In the economic collapse and labor upsurge of the early 1930s, labor ostensibly
won that right. Under the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932 and the National Labor
Relations Act of 1935, workers could organize unions, bargain collectively, and,
when necessary, protest poor working conditions through strikes, picketing, and
boycotts.197 Having won rights to engage in the collective activism that is the
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defining feature of a social movement, the labor movement grew
exponentially.198
Labor’s legal victories proved short-lived. In January 1942, some of the new
rights—especially to strike—were suspended for the duration of the war.199
When the war ended, the no-strike rules and pledges lapsed.200 But the
companies refused to meet the pent-up demand for wage increases, as they
returned to a market economy, without wartime profits.201 A huge strike wave
ensued.202 And in January 1947, when Republicans took control of Congress for
the first time since 1932, they made attacking labor’s power a key part of their
agenda.203 The Taft-Hartley Act reflected the wish list of business interests.204
Taft-Hartley limited the collective rights labor had won in the 1930s. It
protected anti-union employers and employees from the efforts of unions to
organize or to protest unfair practices.205 It authorized the NLRB to seek
injunctions against labor organizing tactics that violated the new restrictions.206
It also authorized any person “injured in his business or property” by union
activities prohibited by the new law to file suit in federal court for damages.207
Employers lost no time in using the new statutory damages liability as a
tactic for quelling union activism in the postwar strike wave. The first judgment
to reach the Supreme Court revealed the full extent of the challenge that unions
now faced when engaged in movement activism. An Alaskan lumber company
known as Juneau Spruce sued the ILWU. The ILWU had waged a general strike
in San Francisco in 1934, had won strikes and good contracts up and down the
coast, and organized across racial lines.208 Just after the end of World War II,
the ILWU helped Hawai’ian sugar and pineapple plantation workers unionize,
forever transforming the Islands.209 The Juneau Spruce case sought to smash the
union from Alaska to San Diego to Hawai’i.
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See supra note 39.
ROBERT H. ZIEGER, THE CIO: 1935–1955, at 168–73 (1995).
See GROSS, supra note 89, at 5.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 5–6.
See id. at 1–14.
Id. at 4.
Id.
29 U.S.C. § 187.
See, e.g., HARVEY SCHWARTZ, SOLIDARITY STORIES: AN ORAL HISTORY OF THE ILWU 17–31 (2009).
Id. at 220–73; SANFORD ZALBURG, A SPARK IS STRUCK! JACK HALL & THE ILWU IN HAWAII (1979).
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The lawyers who litigated the case for the union were, by any measure, cause
lawyers, and the union organizing that the ILWU did in the Pacific was social
movement activism. The lawyers preserved the records of the case.210 It enables
a close look at law, lawyers, and social movements. And it enables us to consider
how the law after 1947 channeled labor movement activity, and how that effect
rippled beyond labor unions to influence the movements that came after.
A. Labor on the Docks in 1947
Juneau, for centuries a favorite fishing ground of indigenous peoples, by the
1930s had a thriving lumber and commercial fishing industry and a population
of about 5,000.211 In the mid-1930s, longshoremen unionized and secured a
collective bargaining agreement with the Juneau Lumber Company to load
lumber onto ships at its lumber mill.212 The company and ILWU Local 16 signed
successive contracts each year until 1942, the year after the U.S. entered the
war.213 Because wages were fixed and strikes were prohibited during wartime,
the mill and the ILWU simply continued the 1942 contract in effect for the war’s
duration.214 The International Woodworkers Association, CIO, represented the
mill workers, and the ILWU Local 16 supplied longshoremen whenever the mill
had enough lumber to load directly from the mill’s dock onto U.S. militarycontrolled vessels.215
By early 1947, lucrative war production was ending.216 A group of investors
from Coos Bay, Oregon acquired the mill and changed its name to Juneau Spruce
Company.217 Little else changed at first. The new owners told the mill workers
they could apply for employment with the new company.218 The mill shut down
210
All archival sources cited on the history of this dispute and the legal aftermath are, unless otherwise
noted, either from the Labor Archives and Research Center (LARC) at the J. Paul Leonard Library, San
Francisco State University or from the ILWU archives in San Francisco.
211
Gastineau Channel Memories, JUNEAU DOUGLAS CITY MUSEUM, https://beta.juneau.org/library/
museum/gastineau-channel-memories-browse/entry/17536 (last visited Sept. 5, 2020).
212
Letter from Germain Bulcke, Vice President, ILWU, to George R. Andersen, Attorney, Gladstein,
Andersen, Resner & Sawyer (Apr. 15, 1949) (on file with the ILWU archives).
213
Id.
214
See ZIEGER, supra note 199; Letter from Germain Bulcke to George R. Andersen (Apr. 15, 1949),
supra note 212.
215
Letter from Germain Bulcke to George R. Andersen (Apr. 15, 1949), supra note 212. A different
perspective on the story, but with the same basic facts, was later told by E.H. Card, the Personnel Manager of
the Juneau Spruce Company in Coos Bay, Oregon, to a House Committee. Labor-Management Relations:
Hearing on H.R. 115 Before the H. Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 83d Cong. 2 (1953) [hereinafter Card Statement]
(statement of E.H. Card, Douglas Fir Industry).
216
Card Statement, supra note 215.
217
Letter from Germain Bulcke to George R. Andersen (Apr. 15, 1949), supra note 212.
218
Card Statement, supra note 215, at 1.
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on Wednesday, April 30 and then reopened on Friday, May 2, under the new
name but with the same workers.219 Juneau Spruce continued to recognize the
IWA for its mill workers and continued to use Local 16 longshoremen.220 But
after the Army terminated its contract with the company in September 1947,
Juneau Spruce found civilian buyers and decided to ship the lumber on its own
barges.221 The company also decided that loading could be done more cheaply
by workers paid on the wage scale of the IWA contract rather than the ILWU
contract.222
The company had other reasons to terminate recognition of the ILWU. In the
autumn of 1947, the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) was in the midst
of an epic internal struggle between centrists and leftists.223 It was the early days
of the Cold War Red Scare, and ILWU President Bridges was rumored to be a
Communist.224 The Taft-Hartley Act required all union leaders to swear in an
affidavit that they were not members of the Communist Party, and it had
forbidden any union whose leaders refused to sign the non-Communist oath to
invoke the processes of the NLRB.225 Bridges, along with several CIO union
leaders, refused to sign.226 CIO President Murray pushed Bridges out of his CIO
leadership position in late 1947 and eventually purged eleven unions, including
the ILWU, from the CIO.227 This turmoil opened the door to other CIO unions
raiding the membership of the dissident unions, and companies were happy to
exploit the dissension, for reasons of anti-Communism, to have less aggressive,
activist unions with which to negotiate, and to use the dissension in the ranks to
lower labor costs.228
What was happening to CIO unions nationwide happened in Alaska. Juneau
Spruce took the chance to get rid of the ILWU. Verne Albright, who was the
regional representative of the ILWU, on the International’s payroll but based in
Alaska, protested to the company that they were changing past practice.229 The
company insisted that it had not assumed any of the labor or other contracts that
219
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had bound its predecessor, so it had no obligation to recognize or bargain with
the ILWU or to use ILWU men on the docks.230
In October 1947, the company used IWA men to load a shipment. Albright
protested, pointing out the longstanding practice and series of contracts
obligating the company to use ILWU workers.231 The company refused to
discuss it, insisting it recognized only the IWA.232 Albright, on behalf of the
ILWU, appealed to the IWA.233 After all, they were both CIO-affiliated unions.
IWA members in Juneau voted that the work was properly within ILWU’s
jurisdiction.234 But the company refused to accept the two unions’ resolution of
the matter.235 Over Albright’s protest, IWA men loaded a second barge in
January 1948.236 When the company tried to load a third barge in the first week
of April, the members of Local 16 finally had exhausted their patience, and a
few men established a peaceful “nominal picket line” at just one of the mill’s
many entrances with signs saying, “Locked out by Juneau Spruce.”237
IWA workers refused to cross the picket line.238 Rather than negotiate with
the ILWU, the company decided to shut the mill down temporarily.239 Although
“5 or 6 young kids” were initially willing to cross the picket line, said an ILWU
man later, that stopped when men in the mill refused to work with “scabs.”240
The company appealed to the Chamber of Commerce, which set up a factfinding commission on the dispute.241 But a representative from the American
Federation of Labor (AFL) and another from the CIO managed to get on the
commission, so the hearing did not produce the company’s desired result.242
Afterward, said Albright, “public sentiment is more critical of management than
usual in Juneau.”243 On May 10, the company tried once again to get the men to
return to work, but only three showed up.244 The day after that, the door to the
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time clock office was found nailed shut.245 Juneau Spruce had clearly
underestimated the resolve of the longshoremen.
Company managers tried another tack. They promised William Flint, an
ambitious 21-year-old IWA millworker, an opportunity to rise in the company
if he could get the IWA to break ranks with the ILWU.246 The company sent him
to Oregon to meet with the leaders of the IWA.247 The strategy worked. On July
9, 1948, the mill reopened with IWA workers who crossed the picket line and
loaded a barge.248 Flint, who was elected president of the IWA on the same day
the IWA members voted to cross the ILWU picket line, accompanied the barge
to Prince Rupert, British Columbia, to ensure the men at the port would unload
it.249 Flint had no more success with ILWU men there than he had in Juneau;
they refused to unload it because the ILWU had put Juneau Spruce on the
union’s unfair list.250 So the barge continued to Tacoma, Washington, where,
finally, Flint found AFL men to unload it.251 Tacoma was one of only three
Pacific Coast ports where longshoremen belonged to the conservative AFLaffiliated International Longshoremen’s Association rather than the progressive
ILWU.252
The company closed the mill for good in October 1948, claiming the
picketing prevented them from getting the lumber unloaded at ports of delivery
for months at a time.253 In October 1949, the mill burned down.254 It was not
rebuilt.255 The historical record does not reveal the cause of the fire, whether the
property was insured, or whether an insurance claim was paid. Flint’s loyalty
was rewarded, however; he remained employed by Juneau Spruce after the mill
was gone.256
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The story might have ended there, but for the Taft-Hartley Act.
B. The Taft-Hartley Act Offers a New Tool
Taft-Hartley provided the tool that the Juneau Spruce company needed to
combat Local 16’s resistance. Section 8(b)(4) of the Act made it unlawful for a
union to strike, or to encourage employees to strike, with certain prohibited
objectives, including to change working conditions of an employer other than
the employees’ own (known as a secondary strike) or to force an employer to
assign work to members of one union rather than another (known as a
jurisdictional strike).257 Juneau Spruce hired a Portland law firm to file an unfair
labor practice charge under section 8(b)(4) against Local 16 and the
International.258 Taft-Hartley also added two powerful new remedies to protect
employers—remedies unavailable to workers—and Juneau Spruce sought both.
First, the company invoked a provision of the Act that required the NLRB to
seek an immediate preliminary injunction against any violation of section
8(b)(4) and required the agency’s lawyers to prioritize seeking such injunctions
over all other cases.259 What this meant is that when Juneau Spruce filed its
charge with the Board, the staff in the regional office were required by law to
immediately investigate the charge and, if they found merit to it, to seek an
injunction against it.260 The second provision of Taft-Hartley that Juneau Spruce
invoked was section 303, which allowed any person “injured in his business or
property by reason of” any violation of section 8(b)(4) to sue for damages in
federal court.261 This meant that even if the NLRB decided that picketing was
legally permissible and declined to issue a complaint or seek an injunction,
Juneau Spruce could still recover damages in federal court.
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For its defense against the unfair labor practice proceedings before the
NLRB and the damages suit in federal court, the ILWU turned to their regular
counsel, a small San Francisco law firm known for representing unpopular
clients, including labor activists.262 Like other progressive labor lawyers of the
era, some had come to labor law as a distinct field of practice when it emerged
in the 1920s from tort and criminal cases dealing with interference with business
during the World War I-era campaign for civil liberties. They were drawn to
representation of labor unions because they were socialists or progressives who
thought law could be an instrument of social change.263 The enactment of the
New Deal labor legislation, as well as wage, hour, and workers’ compensation
laws, transformed labor law practice from the defense of outlaws to an
affirmative project of representing workers demanding enforcement of
minimum standards and the right to unionize and bargain collectively.264 By
1947, when the Juneau Spruce litigation arose, an ABA study of the legal
profession found that “[f]ormerly, unions conducted their own everyday affairs,
but today lawyers have become necessary not only for momentous issues but
also for the daily problems of the union.”265
The trial was handled by George Andersen, a Danish immigrant who had
dropped out of school after the sixth grade to support his family by working as
a boilermaker and graduated from the night law school program of the
University of San Francisco.266 The appellate work was handled principally by
262
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Richard Gladstein, who had worked his way through his undergraduate and law
school education at the University of California at Berkeley and who had been
passed over for a job at the Alameda County District Attorney’s office because
of a Jewish quota.267 Gladstein later explained that he chose to represent union
activists, including accused Communists in various sedition prosecutions,
because their cases raised “the most important civil liberties issue in America
today.”268 The junior partner in the firm, Norman Leonard, was the son of Jewish
immigrants and came to union labor representation fresh from Columbia Law
School.269 The lawyers were involved in all sorts of progressive labor, civil
rights, and civil liberties work, including litigation that declared closed shop
agreements unenforceable if the union excluded Black people from membership;
they also represented civil rights activists seeking to invalidate an injunction
against picketing to protest race discrimination by a chain of Bay Area grocery
stores.270 They faced tremendous hostility for their work. The FBI tapped their
phones and conducted a long investigation into their alleged subversive
activities.271 In January 1948, a gunman entered the law office on a Saturday
morning.272 Finding George Andersen alone at work, the gunman shot Andersen
and fled.273 Although the police and the press claimed the motive was robbery,
the lawyers were fairly sure the motive was intimidation.274
When the Juneau Spruce dispute began, the Taft-Hartley Act was so new
that its meaning was uncertain, but Andersen and his colleagues worried about
its implications for the ILWU’s picketing as soon as the law was enacted.275 On
the lawyers’ advice, the International wired the Local to warn them of the new
penalties for labor picketing: “Is ILWU and IWA engaged in jurisdictional
dispute re this sawmill[?] . . . Obligatory upon NLRB to seek injunction against
such actions. Union subject to damage suits[.]”276
The lawyers’ fears were justified. Although the first NLRB field agent
rejected the company’s unfair labor practice charge after investigation, and the
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NLRB in Washington rejected the company’s appeal,277 the company persisted.
After the ambitious young Flint got IWA members to cross the ILWU picket
line, the company convinced the NLRB to issue a complaint on the charge that
the picketing was an unlawful jurisdictional strike.278
The company was not content with waiting for the NLRB investigation and
hearing to decide whether the picketing was lawful, and so in October 1948—a
year before the agency would award the work to the IWA—the company also
filed suit under section 303 against both Local 16 and the International.279
Although the International had no involvement in the dispute other than allowing
its regional organizer, Vern Albright, to work as Local 16’s sole paid staffer, it
did have money.280 The theory of liability against the International was that
Albright had acted on behalf of the International when he helped the Local.281
The company argued to the jury (and, later, to the court of appeals) that
Albright’s involvement, along with the International’s having placed Juneau
Spruce on the union’s unfair list (which prevented the barges from being
unloaded in Prince Rupert), made it jointly and severally liable for the
company’s lost profits from April 1948, when the picketing began, until the trial
commenced.282
Andersen and Gladstein attacked this theory on several fronts. First, from
April to July, the IWA agreed with the ILWU that the loading should have been
done by ILWU workers as had been the past practice.283 Second, they insisted
the picketing was an entirely permissible protest of the company’s unfair labor
practice, at least until September 1949, when the NLRB determined that the
work was legally the province of the mill workers, rather than the
longshoremen.284 How, they argued, could it be wrong to protest a work
assignment when the agency charged with deciding such disputes had not acted?
Finally, from the point of view of the ILWU, the whole thing happened because
the company refused to respect the decision of both the IWA and the ILWU that
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the loading on the docks should be done by longshoremen, as it always had
been.285 All of Juneau Spruce’s damages could have been avoided, the ILWU
argued at trial (and later to the Senate, urging an amendment to the Taft-Hartley
Act to remove the legal prohibition of protests like the one in Juneau) if the
company had honored the two unions’ votes that the work was properly within
the jurisdiction of the ILWU.286 But the Taft-Hartley Act empowered the
company to ignore the unions’ resolution and then to sue for the damages that
the unions’ vote was intended to prevent. Having refused to accept the amicable
solution to the problem and therefore prompting a strike, according to the ILWU,
the employer had caused its own problems.287
The jury accepted the company’s view across the board and awarded
$750,000 for lost profits.288 While the case made its way through the appeals
process, Gladstein and Andersen worked furiously to plan for the possibility that
the judgment would be upheld.289 Among other things, they warned the union
that the company could collect the judgment through a variety of intrusive
methods: the company could get a court order allowing it to collect any money
in any of the International’s bank accounts; it could put a lien on any of the
union’s real or personal property; it could have the court appoint a receiver to
take control of the union and to collect any dues paid by any local union to the
International.290 As it turned out, the company did all of those things.
The case caused much consternation within the union because the enormous
damages judgment (worth about $8 million in 2020 dollars) would bankrupt the
International and destroy the union.291 And the Juneau Spruce judgment was not
the only financial emergency facing the union. In the same month the Juneau
Spruce jury returned its verdict, a federal grand jury indicted Harry Bridges for
lying in his naturalization hearing by saying that he was not a Communist, and
it also indicted two other ILWU leaders for aiding and abetting his alleged
lies.292 In addition, the ILWU was in the middle of a huge strike in Hawai’i in
support of the newly organized sugar and pineapple workers, as well as a
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warehouse strike on the mainland.293 ILWU leaders were convinced (not without
reason) that the employers in all these far-flung matters were communicating
with each other; the situation, they thought, “appears to be an all-out fight by the
employers to wipe out our union.”294
Although the lawyers and the union’s leaders worried about the existential
threat of Taft-Hartley injunctions and damages generally, and the Juneau Spruce
judgment in particular, they made a strategic decision to approach the case in the
courts as a narrow and technical matter of an overbroad statutory provision. The
strategy produced a comparably narrow and technical Supreme Court loss in
January 1952.295 In a brief, unanimous opinion by Justice Douglas, the Court
rejected the union’s principal argument, which was that employers should not
recover damages for picketing that had occurred before the NLRB ruled that the
picketing union was not entitled to the work.296
C. “The Old Business of Cops and Robbers, Chasing Debtors”
The high stakes, post-judgment maneuvering to prevent the judgment from
bankrupting the union became an epic battle of lawyer wits that began before
the Court ruled and lasted for several years after. As employers in the Pacific
Northwest combined efforts with employers and lawyers in San Francisco and
Hawai’i to collect the judgment by seizing ILWU assets wherever they could be
found, ILWU lawyers became increasingly sure that there was collusion among
them in an effort to smash the union. Years later, Andersen wrote:
The Union recognized that not only was the judgment binding upon it,
but that the efforts to procure the judgment as well as to satisfy it, were
inspired not only by the terms and provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act,
but there were political overtones and desirable political ends being
sought by Juneau Spruce and unknown others believed to be in concert
with them and to whom the harassment or liquidation of the Union
would be of inestimable value as well as satisfaction.297

The ILWU prided itself on being thriftier than other big unions of the era.
Bridges and other ILWU staff and officers famously took as pay no more than
the highest earning member working on the docks,298 and the per capita
payments that local unions gave to the International (a portion of each member’s
293
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dues) were relatively low.299 As a consequence, the lawyers for Juneau Spruce
were going to have a difficult time collecting the judgment. But they went after
it with zeal.
Juneau Spruce hired lawyers in San Francisco and Hawai’i to secure the
appointment of a receiver to take over the financial affairs of the union and find
the bank accounts, buildings, and any money belonging to the International.
Having seen this coming, the International had made certain that it had no money
in the bank.300 As ILWU Vice President Lou Goldblatt recalled, “When they
tried to attach a bank account we had, all they picked up was an overdraft.”301 It
was, he said, “the old business of cops and robbers, chasing debtors,” as the
lawyers for the company battled the lawyers for the union to see who could
outsmart or outlast whom.302 To reduce its assets, the union paid its staff and
vendors six months in advance.303 Still, the company “levied upon every
conceivable bank account in which it could be asserted that the ILWU had an
interest.”304 The company’s lawyers tried to seize and sell the ILWU’s San
Francisco headquarters building, only to discover that the union’s lawyers had
already arranged for it to be sold to a nonprofit organization, with the sale
financed by a large mortgage.305
As the lawyers for Juneau Spruce got ever more frustrated in their efforts to
collect from the International, they decided to go after other ILWU locals—
independent legal entities with no involvement in the dispute—on the theory that
some of the money in their hands could be regarded as the International’s assets
(because of ILWU bylaws obligating locals to pay a portion of their dues to the
International).306 Attacking the locals was also a way to get leverage to force the
International to settle. The company’s lawyers were right, ultimately, that this
tactic would work, but it took longer than they thought.307 The ILWU and its
lawyers had spent twenty years battling intransigent employers, violent police,
the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC), the AFL, the CIO, the
299
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FBI, the DOJ, and many others over wages, working conditions, communism,
and efforts to deport Harry Bridges.308 Richard Gladstein even spent six months
in federal prison for contempt of court in connection with his representation of
eleven leftist labor and civil rights activists tried for violating the Smith Act,
which prohibited teaching about communism.309 They were used to bareknuckle legal fights and this one was just the latest in a long series. Nevertheless,
not every leader of every local was quite so experienced with legal struggles,
and the International needed to help the leaders of the locals withstand the
onslaught of legal proceedings. And the legal proceedings frequently froze
locals’ accounts whether or not the International had any assets there, which
prevented local unions from paying their staff.
The company tried to weaken the resolve of ILWU members by using debt
collection mechanisms to gather information on them and the activities and
finances of all the local unions.310 Company lawyers subpoenaed all sorts of
information about the International’s strategy and operations beyond its
assets.311 A 1955 subpoena, for example, sought all Executive Board minutes
and “all journals, ledgers, records, and books of account” from 1948 onward,
and the names, locations, and membership information of every ILWU local.312
Membership information, the ILWU protested, was not public information. Still,
union lawyers were not confident they could win litigation to protect this
information, because in the early 1950s, at the height of the HUAC hearings, the
FBI, HUAC, and their sympathizers in the business community were seeking
union membership records all over the country. Union lawyers feared that
compliance with one of these subpoenas would leave union members at risk of
blacklisting.313
The International fought back against the appointment of receivers by
sending a memo to all locals explaining that freezing the assets of the
International meant that there were no assets to pay the various committees and
area arbitrators that resolved disputes in any Pacific port where ILWU members
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worked.314 This was a signal to employers that if the union’s assets were frozen,
the dispute resolution mechanisms on which employers relied to handle quickie
strikes on the docks would also stop. The memo also reminded the locals of a
provision in the ILWU contracts stating that in the event of outside interference
in the union, the contract—and its no-strike clause—was void.315 Just as the
Juneau Spruce Company thought it could use the judgment to bust the
International by breaking down the solidarity of the locals, the ILWU reminded
all the other employers that they had something to lose in the Juneau Spruce
company’s effort to expand the scope of the dispute.316
The union’s situation became desperate when lawyers for Juneau Spruce
filed a suit in federal court in Hawai’i, seeking authority to seize the assets of
Local 142, a huge local that included tens of thousands of sugar and pineapple
plantation workers who had only recently—after epic struggles and major
strikes—joined the ILWU and won collective bargaining agreements.317 To
defuse this strategy, the ILWU had recently changed the union by-laws to make
per capita contributions from locals entirely voluntary.318 That way, the
company could not argue that the assets of the locals were anything to which the
International had a claim and, therefore, the assets of the locals should not be
subject to freezing and seizure. But the Juneau Spruce lawyers had a response
for that: the new “voluntary” per capita rule was a sham. The federal court agreed
and issued an order freezing the assets of the Hawai’i local.319
To protect its members’ hard-earned dues money, Local 142 simply stopped
depositing dues in the bank.320 The union that was famously scrupulous with its
finances was suddenly forced to start acting like the long-derided East Coast and
Gulf Coast International Longshore Association, running its operation out of
bags of cash.321 Yet the ILWU described their activities in these years the way
Hollywood portrayed the French Resistance to the Nazis322—it was all in service
of a noble cause. Not to mention, it was kind of fun to outwit their adversary.
For example, Lou Goldblatt recalled that in 1955, when the International needed
money, he asked lawyer George Andersen—who was going to Hawai’i to work
314
Memorandum from H.J. Bodine & L.B. Thomas, Coast Lab. Rels. Comm., ILWU, to ILWU Locals
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on the case—to bring back some cash. Andersen returned from the islands with
$60,000 in cash.323 Not wanting to keep it on hand, Andersen delivered the
money to Goldblatt at his home on a Friday evening.324 Goldblatt responded,
“What the devil do I want it for? I can’t go down to the bank and put it in the
safety deposit box.”325 Andersen replied, “Well, you asked me to go bring it and
I’m not going to keep it.”326 So, according to Goldblatt, “the money hung around
all weekend and I figured the best thing to do was to put it in the most prominent
place of all, so I just left the thing in a cigar box on the mantelpiece.”327 On
Monday, with the help of a friendly bank teller willing to work after hours,
Goldblatt converted it into cashier’s checks.328
I’d give him a list of bills I wanted paid – salaries, or other expenses;
everything we could prepay, and give him the exact amounts. He
would make out cashier’s checks. He’d call me just as the bank was
closing and I’d go there and knock; he’d open up because he was
expecting me and I’d give him the cash, pick up the cashier’s checks
and have them all mailed within a half hour.329

When the Juneau Spruce lawyers figured this out, they informed Judge
McLaughlin in Hawai’i and asked him to hold the ILWU’s Hawai’i lawyer,
Myer Symonds, in contempt for violating the asset freezing order.330 Symonds
insisted that any knowledge he had of the transaction was protected by attorneyclient privilege, and Judge McLaughlin felt compelled to agree.331 But he did
refer Symonds to the Hawai’i Bar Association for discipline and also to the U.S.
Attorney for prosecution.332 The Bar ultimately determined that attorney-client
privilege had prevented Symonds from disclosing what his client did and,
therefore, he should not be disciplined, and evidently the U.S. Attorney
agreed.333 The judge therefore declined to hold him in contempt.334
As in San Francisco, the company’s lawyers tried to seize Local 142’s
headquarters building in Honolulu, only to discover they had been outfoxed and
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the union had already sold it to a nonprofit.335 There was litigation over whether
the sale was a sham, but ultimately, all the company got from the headquarters
was the value of some furniture and four typewriters.336 Yet, with its assets
frozen and no end to the litigation in sight, in January 1955, Local 142 in
Honolulu (with 23,000 members) decided the only solution was to disaffiliate
with the ILWU, effective immediately.337
Worried that the litigation would wipe out a decade of organizing, ILWU
leaders decided some settlement had to be made. Suspecting that the Juneau
Spruce company was tiring of paying its lawyers to recover nothing, Lou
Goldblatt thought he saw an opening. The union would settle the case for
$68,000 in funds left over from the Harry Bridges legal defense fund.338 When
the company refused to accept their lawyers’ advice to take that deal, ILWU
lawyers landed on another idea.
A few years before, as part of the Hawai’i organizing campaign, ILWU
lawyers had filed a number of collective action suits on behalf of plantation
workers for unpaid overtime under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).339 One
was a test case on behalf of hundreds of cane processing workers.340 The workers
had won at trial, although the amount of their recovery would have to be proved
in individual proceedings.341 Then, the Ninth Circuit overturned the judgment in
its entirety, finding the workers exempt from the FLSA.342 In the March 1955
Supreme Court argument, the tenor of the questions made it seem that the
justices were divided.343 Rather than risk a potentially significant backpay
award, lawyers for the Hawaiian Sugar Planters’ Association (HSPA) offered to
settle the case for $250,000.344 Suddenly the ILWU’s members were going to
have a pile of money. The lawyers, together with ILWU regional director Jack
Hall, local president Jack Kawano, and local leader Freddie Kamahoahoa,
debated whether they should settle the Juneau Spruce case with the Waialua
settlement.345 On the one hand, they would be depriving Hawai’ian workers of
a significant sum of money to pay for picketing that they had had nothing to do
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with. But, on the other, the local leaders also thought that trying to divide up the
recovery would be difficult and could undermine solidarity. As Jack Hall said to
Lou Goldblatt, “Trying to undertake the distribution of $250,000 to whatever
number of guys we had in sugar at the time, 18,000 or 20,000 members, would
be a hopeless job. Some people would get 10 bucks, some people would get
nothing, and it would be more divisive than it’s worth.”346 Moreover, Local 142
had negotiated better protections in a collective agreement in the nine years since
the suit was filed, so the backpay award seemed like ancient history. Thus, even
if the workers won in the Supreme Court, it was not obvious that the legal win
would be a victory from the standpoint of building worker power.
The union took the matter to the workers. Local leaders went from plantation
to plantation and met with all of the roughly 10,000 plaintiffs to explain the
situation. Fewer than half a dozen workers at the 26 affected plantations refused
to approve the settlement and relinquish any claim to the money.347 The ILWU
lawyers settled the sugar case and immediately turned around and settled the
Juneau Spruce case for $250,000.348 On May 23, 1955, just a couple of weeks
after the settlements were negotiated, the Supreme Court handed down its
decision in the Waialua case: the workers were unprotected by FLSA and lost
everything.349 “The HSPA money [was] used to pay Juneau Spruce and it
doesn’t cost the union a goddam nickel!” gloated Goldblatt.350 “Everybody in
the Islands had a big laugh that the Big Five had been taken for a ride; settled
for $250,000 bucks when it wouldn’t have cost them a goddam dime.”351
When the news reported the whole situation, the Honolulu press, which was
a reliable voice for the interests of business, framed the settlement as union
duplicity. Under the headline, It’s the Hawaii Workers Who Pay, the Honolulu
Star Bulletin editorialized, “[t]he damage was done by the I.L.W.U. in Alaska
but it’s the rank-and-file in Hawaii that gets soaked for it!”352 But, the editorial
concluded, “[a]ctually, when the chips are finally distributed, it turns out that the
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lawyers got a lot of the money anyway.”353 This was the one thing the union and
the newspapers could agree on: nobody got any money out of the whole
miserable episode except the company’s lawyers, whose fees consumed the
$250,000 settlement.354
Given how little the Juneau Spruce Company or the Hawai’ian Big Five got
out of the litigation, it is important to bear in mind how much they might have
gotten, and the significance of the Taft-Hartley Act in changing the Pacific Coast
employers’ labor and legal strategy. In the mid-1940s, some shipping and
longshoring companies (at least in San Francisco) seemed to have accepted
unionization and even Harry Bridges, although they persisted in accusing him
of being a Communist.355 All Pacific Coast employers (except in three cities,
including Tacoma, Washington) were parties to the industry-wide collective
agreement with the ILWU, although local unions handled minor disputes locally
with each employer,356 as in the case of Local 16 in Juneau.357 Since 1936, many
contract terms had been imposed, and all disputes had been resolved, through
arbitration, which had occurred under the auspices of the Secretary of Labor and
by the National War Labor Board between 1942 and 1945.358 By the spring of
1947, respected labor economist Clark Kerr reported that the major sources of
disagreement between the Waterfront Employers’ Association of the Pacific
Coast and the ILWU were the pace of work and stopping periodic local work
stoppages.359 Another major disagreement, according to Kerr, concerned the
hiring hall, which was supported by employers.360 The union thought it should
use a rotation system to share work equitably among the whole labor force, but
employers favored a gang system, which would allow employers to request the
same gang of workers for job after job.361 Importantly, Kerr said, the employers
had largely resigned themselves to working with the ILWU.362 Indeed, the
President of the American-Hawaii Shipping Company said that by the mid1940s he had come to the view that although he thought Bridges was a
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Communist, he did not favor deporting him, and he believed the waterfront
employers could and should work with him and with the ILWU.363
But the Taft-Hartley Act offered an opportunity to unsettle the status quo.
As James Rogers, the lawyer for Juneau Spruce, gloated in a meeting of the
Portland, Oregon, Chamber of Commerce, it provided a way to smash the
ILWU, and he and the Big Five seized it.364
D. Union Lawyer Oversight of Worker Direct Action
Although many activist union leaders like those at the ILWU refused to
concede that the Taft-Hartley Act would force them into quiescence, the
aftermath of the Juneau Spruce verdict shows the ways in which the ILWU’s
erstwhile radical leaders and lawyers came to monitor and discourage rank-andfile activism, in order to ensure the union’s continued survival.
As for the leaders, at the first ILWU Executive Board meeting after the
Juneau Spruce verdict, one board member asked how on earth the International
got tangled up in such a mess.365 The leadership’s lengthy and defensive reply
suggested that Local 16 tried to avoid a strike and that the International was
careful about supporting local union protests.366 As ILWU Vice President
Goldblatt recalled, the “five or six very intensive years” after the enactment of
the Taft-Hartley Act were “an extremely difficult and arduous period in the life
of the ILWU. Things piled up on us very quickly.”367 Unlike many other radical
unions, the ILWU retained most of its membership. But its successes in
organizing new and smaller places in Chicago, New Orleans, and Minneapolis
were reversed because “there was no way of hanging on to them during this
era.”368 Employers provoked strikes, knowing they had the remedies of the TaftHartley Act as a tool, and Juneau Spruce was one spectacularly hard-fought
example. “For a period you couldn’t help but feel every morning that the circle
was getting tighter around you; an attack on every flank . . . . We were literally

363
CORINNE L. GILB, ROGER LAPHAM: AN INTERVIEW ON SHIPPING, LABOR, SAN FRANCISCO CITY
GOVERNMENT, AND AMERICAN FOREIGN AID 182 (1957) (“I’d rather put up with the devil that is, so to speak,
than with an unknown one.”).
364
GOLDBLATT ORAL HISTORY, supra note 300, at 419. Readily available archival records do not reveal
the extent to which employers elsewhere on the Pacific coast shared this view. Uncovering the story of what
they thought during this period would be a separate research project.
365
Executive Board Minutes, supra note 291.
366
Id.
367
GOLDBLATT ORAL HISTORY, supra note 300, at 456–57.
368
Id.

FISKREDDYPROOFS_9.30.20

118

9/30/2020 12:01 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 70:63

fighting for survival.”369 The union weathered it all, said Goldblatt, because of
“the tradition of militancy, a deep loyalty on the part of the membership and a
willingness to struggle instead of backing away from these beefs.”370
But it took its toll. Leaders at both the International and some locals
apparently became cautious about resorting to picketing when companies
refused to comply with ILWU collective agreements and also became more
inclined to seek legal advice before acting. Two weeks after the Supreme Court
handed down its decision in Juneau Spruce, the Company gave notice of its
intent to terminate its contracts with the ILWU before they expired and to use
ILWU men for fewer jobs than it had done before.371 The leaders of Local 16
believed this new “BEEF,” as they called it, was copying “the pattern laid by”
Juneau Spruce and was not authorized by the ILWU’s master agreement with
Alaskan employers.372 But rather than act, they promptly wrote to the
International leadership asking for assistance, noting that “this matter may
require Legal-Talent to keep us out of another [costly] Encounter” and the local
needed to “be able to put ourselves on firm ground when and where we have to
negotiate with this Company and its LAWYERS.”373
The effect on the lawyers is even clearer, and more multifaceted. First, the
case prompted union lawyer review of the ILWU’s newspaper, The
Dispatcher.374 The judgment against the International was based, in part, on The
Dispatcher’s coverage of the picketing at the mill; the paper’s publication of the
company being on the unfair list had prompted ILWU members to refuse to
unload the barges in Prince Rupert, British Columbia.375 Unnerved by the
prospect that company lawyers would read The Dispatcher as ratifying illegal
local conduct, Goldblatt fired off a terse memo to the staff of The Dispatcher
and the union’s publicity department instructing them that henceforward, “all
articles or editorials on Juneau Spruce which are written for the Dispatcher, must
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be checked with Allan Brotsky, in Gladstein’s office before publication.”376 For
Brotsky, who was devoted to the cause of civil liberties, censoring the newspaper
to protect the union’s legal position must have been a dreary task. To be sure,
the paper remained a lively voice of criticism of the Juneau Spruce decision; the
editor devoted half an issue to the Supreme Court’s ruling with stories and
cartoons condemning it as a “new strikebreaking gimmick”377 that would allow
the national CIO, which “has been trying to destroy us for years,” and “courts
just as eager as [the] CIO,” to “smash militant, autonomous unions.”378 Still, it
is impossible to know the path not taken here—how the birth of attorney review
of union communications altered the course of what might have been said.
In addition to censoring The Dispatcher, the union’s attorneys also took on
a more prominent role in evaluating proposed picketing, strikes, and boycotts
for possible damages liability. In January 1951, while Juneau Spruce was on
appeal, Allan Brotsky wrote to an organizer for the International, cautioning him
about getting involved in local disputes.379 Similarly, when Local 16 sought
advice about a “new beef,” Brotsky cautioned:
[E]ven though the Company may be breaching its agreement with
Local 16 by diverting work now done by longshoremen . . . the Local
has no right to picket the Company to prevent them from doing
that . . . . Fantastic as this may seem, this is precisely what the TaftHartley [Act] provides as that law has now been interpreted by the
Supreme Court of the United States.”380

And so, Brotsky concluded, picketing to enforce the contract “would subject
the Local (and undoubtedly the International, . . . ), to law suits for damages.”381
Brotsky took this stance even though the facts of the Juneau Lumber dispute
were arguably distinguishable from the Juneau Spruce case; the loss had made
him risk averse.
Allan Brotsky also instructed Lincoln Fairley, the ILWU Research Director,
that the Juneau Spruce verdict had come about because “the International
Representative in question” had not “understood the problems raised by the
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Taft[-]Hartley Act”382 and had failed to clarify that he was acting only on behalf
of the Local, not the International.383 Fairley then drafted a memo to all locals
explaining that “the beefs which lead to damage suits are ordinarily beefs in
which individual locals become involved . . . . The International has no authority
to start the beef, to participate in it, to direct it, to encourage it or to assist it by
financial means.”384 Fairley was forced to explain that “[t]he consequence of
these provisions of [the Taft-Hartley] Act is that union officials and
representatives need to watch their step so as not to involve the International in
any situation which is likely to result in damages suits[.]”385 The courts and the
NLRB would consider International staff as agents of locals for purposes of TaftHartley Act liability “unless they take affirmative steps to make it clear that they
are not, in fact, acting in that capacity.”386 This was a delicate task. Even
providing staff with the advice that the lawyer recommended was fraught, as
Fairley warned: “You will bear in mind, I am sure, the possible use which an
employer or court could make of the letter if it fell into their hands.”387
The threat was quite real, as lawyers for labor and management both saw the
Juneau Spruce case as an effort to break the union that nearly succeeded. Only
a couple of months before settling the litigation, James Rogers, one of Juneau
Spruce’s lead attorneys, said in a speech to the Manufacturers Committee of the
Chamber of Commerce that the judgment would empower the ILWU’s rival, the
more conservative and quiescent Sailors Union of the Pacific, and it would be a
“fight to the finish” for the ILWU.388 The ILWU, Rogers crowed, might have to
disband.389
Even years later, the ILWU remained cautious about the prospect of liability
for activism, even as it remained committed to supporting direct action by
workers on a movement-wide basis. The ILWU and its California locals
supported the efforts of California farmworkers to organize during the grape
boycott of the 1960s. For a brief period, ILWU members honored a picket set
up by farmworkers at the ports of San Francisco and Oakland to protest the
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shipment of struck grapes.390 But the ILWU and the United Farm Workers
(UFW) both paid damages for this secondary boycott.391 When the ILWU local
president—James Herman—agreed to help the farmworkers, he warned that
they would only be able to get away with picketing for a short time and that the
UFW members should tell no one that Herman had helped.392 Even fifty years
after the Supreme Court’s Juneau Spruce ruling, members and staff attending a
2002 ILWU leadership conference were still being instructed about what the
case held and the threats that Taft-Hartley restrictions pose for union activism.393
The risks remain very real. As we noted at the beginning, in November 2019,
the ILWU was once again subject to a huge damages verdict under section 303
when members of its Portland, Oregon local engaged in a campaign of protest
activity—including a slowdown, though not a strike—to protest the refusal to
recognize that certain work was within the jurisdiction of the ILWU.394 The
plaintiff, a subsidiary of a Philippine multinational corporation, claimed that it
had suffered almost $94 million in lost profits and other damages and had been
forced to withdraw from its contract with the Port of Portland to operate a port
terminal.395 ICTSI sued the union on an array of theories, including for alleged
antitrust violations and for unlawful secondary boycotts.396 A jury apparently
agreed and split the $94 million in damages between the International and its
local.397 The resemblance to Juneau Spruce is startling, including in the union’s
delicate balance in how to react publicly to the threat that the judgment will
smash the union.398 Although local and national news reports covered the
case,399 the union said nothing. According to one journalist covering the matter,
the union’s lawyers feared that allowing their client to speak to the press would
anger the judge, a risk they could not afford to take while their motion to reduce
or set aside the verdict was on his desk.400 Many social movement organizations
faced with such a crushing blow would use “name, blame, shame” protests and
390
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mass mobilization to show they speak for the people, against the power of
business and government. But the union, at its lawyers’ behest, sits quietly in
the hope that the judge will spare the union from disaster.401
III. BRINGING LABOR BACK INTO LAW AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS STUDIES
The Juneau Spruce saga was much discussed in the labor press at the time,
and it remains part of the ILWU’s historiography and collective identity.402 Yet,
in the law and social movements literature, what this case exemplifies about
labor’s experience with law and, in turn, the multifaceted relationship between
law and social movements are largely unexplored.
In this Part, we begin with an analysis of how labor’s experience with law
complicates the dimensions of law and social movements scholarship identified
in Part I.C. We then turn to broader theorizing about the relationship between
law and social movements. We conclude with some thoughts on the future of
labor as a social movement.
A. Seeing Social Movements Through the Lens of Labor
Seeing social movements through the lens of labor complicates all five of
the dimensions of the law and social movements literature discussed in Part I.
1. How Law Channels Movements
Perhaps the most important benefit of bringing labor back into law and social
movements studies is that it challenges how we understand the conjunctive
metaphor that links law to social movements. Labor’s experience shifts the
emphasis away from “legal mobilization”—how movements strategically use
law—and from demosprudence—how movements make and change law.403
These theories see social movements as the subject, and law as the object. The
ILWU’s experience of the law in the Juneau Spruce case is distinct, however. It

401
The judge did not spare the union from disaster, but did allow ICTSI to choose remittitur, reducing the
verdict to $19 million, and alternatively ordering a new trial on damages. ICTSI Oregon, 442 F. Supp. 3d at
1366; see Bernstein, supra note 6. But $19 million is still more than twice the total assets of the union. The
employer refused to accept the remittitur, and the matter is now before the trial judge on the union’s motion for
interlocutory appeal. See ICTSI Oregon, Inc. v. Int’l Longshore & Warehouse Union, No. 3:12-cv-1058-SI, 2020
WL 2768683, at *1 (D. Or. May 28, 2020).
402
See ZALBURG, supra note 209, at 382–88.
403
See supra Part I.C.1.
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is not about how social movements act upon law, but rather about how law acts
upon social movements.
Labor’s experience with law in the Juneau Spruce matter is largely about
law being used to regulate movement activity—a form of what other scholars
have referred to as “channeling.”404 In their theorization of how law channels
social movements, John McCarthy and his co-authors argue that even seemingly
mundane forms of regulation, such as tax law and postal service rules, affect
social movement behavior through “a tangle of incentives favoring certain
standard forms of organization, tactical approaches, and collective goals.”405
These, they argue, promote “voluntary” compliance with state-desired ends.406
Labor’s experience highlights that channeling can fundamentally reshape a
movement, regardless of whether the movement proactively invokes legal tools.
Labor scholars have long shown how government regulation of unions
creates a tangle of incentives toward less radical, less political, more selfinterested behavior.407 The Norris-LaGuardia and Wagner Acts reduced outright
repression of labor as a social movement, but they channeled union activism
towards a state-preferred goal—collective bargaining—and away from more
radical movement objectives, including broad-based organizing aimed at
exerting working-class power.408 And, as Christopher Tomlins pointed out, the
Wagner Act changed the structure under which unions organized by requiring
them to adhere to the NLRB’s determination of what constituted an appropriate

404
The term “channeling” has been used with different meanings by different scholars in the literature.
Generally, it suggests the ways in which law can orient movement activity down a particular path, from which
various institutional constraints make it difficult to deviate. Law channels social movements during litigation
campaigns seeking to expand rights of minorities; once a movement proactively engages with law, that
engagement alters the movement’s trajectory, including even its protest activity, to focus on the rights seeking
to be established in litigation. Leachman, supra note 125, at 1737–49. Similarly, Tomiko Brown-Nagin’s study
of movement mobilization in defense of affirmative action reveals that “social movements that define themselves
through law risk undermining their insurgent role in the political process, and thus undermining their agendasetting ability.” Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Elites, Social Movements, and the Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1436, 1436
(2005).
405
John D. McCarthy, David W. Britt & Mark Wolfson, The Institutional Channeling of Social Movements
by the State in the United States, 13 RSCH. SOC. MOVEMENTS, CONFLICTS & CHANGE 45 (1991).
406
Id. at 49.
407
See FORBATH, supra note 24; MCCANN, supra note 24; Rogers, supra note 25.
408
The focus on legal mobilization rather than on organizing is one of the chief criticisms of contemporary
social movements, and it is made especially forcefully by labor scholars, and by few so forcefully as Jane
McAlevey. See Eleni Schirmer, Jane McAlevey’s Vision for the Future of American Labor, NEW YORKER
(June 10, 2020), https://www.newyorker.com/books/under-review/jane-mcaleveys-vision-for-the-future-ofamerican-labor. McAlevey points out that law played an outsize role in directing union power away from broadbased organizing and direct action, toward weaker forms of action which left managerial power untouched. JANE
MCALEVEY, A COLLECTIVE BARGAIN: UNIONS, ORGANIZING, AND THE FIGHT FOR DEMOCRACY 58–61 (2020).
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bargaining unit, rather than what the union considered best for its organizational
objectives and worker interests.409 Judicial interpretations of the NLRA, as well
as the legislative changes wrought by Taft-Hartley, increased the costs of certain
movement tactics—such as the sit-down strike that had been crucial to
organizing Detroit in 1937,410 slowdowns by workers who feared an all-out
strike,411 wildcat strikes,412 or the picketing at Juneau Spruce. Courts, and to a
lesser extent the NLRB, imported pre-NLRA notions from master-servant law
into the new labor law in ways that constrained the rights of workers to act
collectively.413 Law accordingly channeled worker militance into periodic
strikes in support of enterprise-based collective bargaining and rewarded unions
that honored no-strike clauses.
The Juneau Spruce episode also reveals the processes by which channeling
occurs, even as labor movement actors—including their lawyers—consciously
attempt to resist it. The ILWU had long been a union which bucked bureaucratic
conservatism in favor of more radical, direct action.414 In 1952, that choice
almost bankrupted the union. The ILWU’s attorneys were deeply committed to
rank-and-file leadership; yet, they had to reckon with how important their legal
knowledge, and legal prudence, could be to the institutions they served. Lawyers
started reviewing the union newspaper for unnecessarily risky statements.415
They warned leaders about involving the International in local disputes.416 And
when faced with the prospect of a new “beef” several years later, one that looked
unsettlingly like the Juneau Spruce case, the lawyers favored a more
conservative approach and cautioned against picketing.417
The effect (intentional or not) of the employers’ use of the restrictive law
regulating unions was not just to channel labor activity into weaker and less

409
Christopher L. Tomlins, AFL Unions in the 1930s: Their Performance in Historical Perspective, 65 J.
AM. HIST. 1021, 1041 (1979).
410
James Gray Pope, Worker Lawmaking, Sit-Down Strikes, and the Shaping of American Industrial
Relations, 1935-1948, 24 LAW & HIST. REV. 45, 74–82 (2006).
411
James Atleson, Elk Lumber, Slowdowns, and the Suppression of Worker Solidarity (1950), in
AMERICAN LABOR STRUGGLES AND LAW HISTORIES (Kenneth M. Casebeer ed., 2d ed. 2017).
412
NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 263 (1939) (overturning an NLRB order that
peaceful sit-down strikers were entitled to reinstatement at conclusion of strike); James Gray Pope, How
American Workers Lost the Right to Strike, and Other Tales, 103 MICH. L. REV. 518, 533–34 (2004).
413
JAMES ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW (1983); STUART CHINN,
RECALIBRATING REFORM: THE LIMITS OF POLITICAL CHANGE 109–51 (2014).
414
See SCHWARTZ, supra note 208.
415
See supra text accompanying note 376.
416
See supra text accompanying note 380.
417
See supra text accompanying note 381.
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disruptive activities, but also, importantly, to conscript unwilling union lawyers
in blunting union activism.
While labor is unique among social movements in the extent to which it has
been subject to nationwide and movement-specific regulation, law plays a
structuring role in all movements; it constitutes the terrain on which movements
and counter-movements engage in strategic action. One example of how
background legal rules were employed in an attempt to regulate civil rights
movement organizations—and to leverage their specific institutional structure
against them—is NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, decided in 1958.418 At
that time, the NAACP drew much of its funding, as well as its legitimacy, from
its membership base. Alabama tried to employ state corporation laws to drive
the NAACP out of the state, and in the course of that litigation, subpoenaed the
organization’s membership list.419 Given the extreme hostility in the state to the
movement, and opponents’ willingness to violently attack supporters, had the
state been successful in asserting a right to membership lists, it could have
fundamentally altered how the organization functioned. In that case, however,
the Supreme Court concluded that freedom of association trumped the normal
operation of civil discovery—and thereby helped preserve the civil rights
movement as we know it.420
The trajectory of other movements has similarly been altered by the
operation of law. As scholars have noted,421 the decision of LGBTQ activists
and lawyers to focus on marriage equality was a product of many factors, but
among them were the legal repression of gay sociability in bars and bath
houses.422 The HIV/AIDS epidemic enabled cities to portray gay sexual
liberation as a public health danger and to use local government power to shut
down sexually oriented businesses. This legal change fundamentally altered the
shape of the movement—not just the contexts in which people would gather, but
what they were able to imagine.423
418

357 U.S. 449 (1958). The authors thank Nelson Lichtenstein for this insight.
Id. at 458–59.
420
Id. at 467.
421
Cf. MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM THE CLOSET TO THE ALTAR: COURTS, BACKLASH, AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE xx (2013) (noting that although the gay rights movement in the 1970s and
1980s made progress on other issues, marriage equality was “of little interest to most gay activists” until about
1990 when, “partly because of the AIDS epidemic, the issue of legal recognition of same-sex relationships
became more salient to the public and more important to gay activists”).
422
Id.
423
Indeed, one scholar has argued that after the gay rights movement had successfully challenged police
harassment of gay bars with predominantly white, middle-class patrons, the movement largely lost interest in
criminal justice, with devastating consequences for the growth of the carceral state and the fate of gay people of
color. Timothy Stewart-Winter, Queer Law and Order: Sex, Criminality, and Policing in the Late Twentieth419
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Law and social movements literature has understandably focused on how
movements use law. But how law also represses, restricts, constrains, and
channels all movements must equally be part of the story.

2. When Movements Are Institutions with Something to Lose
The literature on law and social movements, and on social movements
generally, has struggled to make sense of the dividing line between social
movements and institutions.424 Labor’s experience contributes to theorization of
the costs and benefits of varying levels of institutionalization, and how
institutionalization mediates the relationship between social movements and
law.
Unions became institutions because they saw it as a path to building worker
power.425 For example, in the 1930s, the ILWU eliminated the day labor market
at every port—the “shape-up,” with all the discrimination, blacklisting, bribery,
daily humiliations, and arbitrariness of employers picking who would get work
each day.426 In its place, the union created hiring halls to distribute work fairly
to all longshoremen who abided by union rules.427 The ILWU, like every other
union, hired staff to organize and to research employers and industries to
improve their bargaining position.428 And unions created health and welfare and
retirement funds, to improve their members’ lives, and to grow the union.429
Unions created these and other institutions so that workers could exert control
over their work lives and economic well-being, rather than submitting to
whatever policies employers or the state might impose.
When employers recognized unions, they began to rely on the unions as
institutions to perform an array of economic and social welfare functions.430
Century United States, 102 J. AM. HIST. 61, 62 (2015).
424
See supra Part I.
425
Cynthia Estlund has described labor unions’ dual character—which we conceptualize here as an
institutionalized social movement—in distinct, although not inconsistent, terms. She considers labor unions as a
particular species of “private entities with public regulatory functions.” Cynthia Estlund, Are Unions a
Constitutional Anomaly?, 114 U. MICH. L. REV. 169, 169 (2015).
426
See SCHWARTZ, supra note 208, at 8 (collecting oral histories of ILWU’s founding in the Bay Area,
including examples of corruption and favoritism that hiring hall eliminated).
427
See id.
428
See id. at 33.
429
See Nelson Lichtenstein, From Corporatism to Collective Bargaining: Organized Labor and the
Eclipse of Social Democracy in the Postwar Era, in THE RISE AND FALL OF THE NEW DEAL ORDER (Steve Fraser
& Gary Gerstle eds., 1989) (describing growth of union bargaining over benefit plans in the postwar period).
430
See generally JACOB HACKER, THE DIVIDED WELFARE STATE: THE BATTLE OVER PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE SOCIAL BENEFITS IN THE UNITED STATES (2002) (describing the development of publicly subsidized
and regulated, but privately provided, health and retirement benefits and other forms of social insurance).
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They also relied on unions to be “responsible” by enforcing the collective
bargaining agreements they negotiated.431 This concept of “responsible
unionism”—that unions should abide by no-strike clauses in collective
bargaining agreements and, more generally, refrain from radical activism that
disrupts the smooth and profitable functioning of business—had its origins in
political debates over the propriety of damages judgments against unions for the
epic strikes in mines, factories, and railroads in the Gilded Age.432 When the
Taft-Hartley Act made unions entities (like corporations) that could be sued
apart from their members, and thus liable to suit in federal court for breach of
collective bargaining agreements433 and violation of strike prohibitions, it
achieved employers’ long-sought goal of law being a tool in requiring
“responsible unionism.”
Juneau Spruce confirmed union leaders’ worst fears about the dangers of
being liable for damages. What looked to the members of Local 16 as a perfectly
ordinary picket line protesting the company’s unfair labor practice and breach
of contract looked to a jury as the International’s illegal jurisdictional strike.434
And, in calculating damages, what union members thought was a laudable
exercise of labor solidarity among ILWU and IWA members looked to the court
like a concerted effort to ruin a business.435
In the fight to resist judgment collection, the union tried to transform the
constraint of “responsible unionism” into a source of strength. In particular, it
sought to portray the threat to its resources as leverage.436 By reminding the
employer association that the system for arbitrating workplace disputes would
come to a halt if the union could no longer pay for arbitrators, union leaders were
also reminding them that, absent arbitration, grievances would prompt walkouts, and walk-outs would slow down the handling of cargo, leave ships tied up
at the docks, and ultimately, cost the shippers more than it would cost the striking
workers.

431
RUTH O’BRIEN, WORKERS’ PARADOX: THE REPUBLICAN ORIGINS OF NEW DEAL LABOR POLICY, 1886–
1935, at 39–41, 51–56 (1998) (tracing the history of the concept of responsible unionism to debates over railroad
strikes and whether unions are liable as entities for strikes and boycotts undertaken by their members).
432
Id.
433
Section 301(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act provided that a labor organization “shall be bound by the acts
of its agents” and “may sue or be sued as an entity.” 29 U.S.C. § 185(b). It protected against the worst abuses by
saying that “[a]ny money judgment against a labor organization . . . shall be enforceable only against the
organization as an entity and against its assets, and shall not be enforceable against any individual member or
his assets.” Id.
434
Int’l Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union v. Juneau Spruce Corp., 342 U.S. 237, 240 (1952).
435
Id.
436
See supra text accompanying notes 432–35.
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Juneau Spruce illustrates that legal regulation of the labor movement has
worked so well precisely because unions are institutions. A massive damages
judgment is not as grave a threat to a group with no assets because the judgment
cannot be collected. And if it cannot be collected, then many litigants will not
go to the trouble of suing in the first place. The power of the ILWU depended
not just on the solidarity of its members, but on the contracts that the union
negotiated, and the staff and monetary resources the union could bring to bear
in negotiating and enforcing labor contracts. Bankrupting the union would
jeopardize that power.
There is a romantic quality to the vision of social movements as inchoate
groups of mobilized people, rather than institutions; that vision suggests
ideological purity and intrepidness. Yet, while institutionalization has at times
been labor’s Achilles’ heel, it has also been a source of power. As Nelson
Lichtenstein has theorized, the energy and commitment of non-institutionalized
movements tends to fade away.437 Unions have endured because “[m]ember
dues pay for a staff whose task it is to continually mobilize the membership,
recruit new ones, and confront employer and state opponents.”438
Juneau Spruce reveals that the strength of an institutionalized social
movement becomes a vulnerability in a hostile legal climate. Bringing labor
back into the law and social movements conversation complicates existing
theories about how all movements navigate the trade-offs of institutionalization.
3. Social Movement Lawyers in Service of Institutional Clients
Law and social movements scholarship often portrays lawyers as advocates
fighting for legal change.439 As a result, much of the literature focuses on
movements led by lawyers.440 Labor aspired to be a movement led by workers,
not lawyers. And yet, lawyers have also shaped the trajectory of labor, albeit for
different reasons than most other social movements.441 Lawyers are not only part

437
Nelson Lichtenstein, Twenty-First Century “Populism:” Not for the Unions and a Good Thing Too, 14
FORUM 235, 245 (2016).
438
Id.
439
See supra Part I.
440
There is a robust literature about what lawyers do to and for progressive social movements generally,
and for the civil rights movement in particular. See, e.g., SUSAN D. CARLE, DEFINING THE STRUGGLE: NATIONAL
ORGANIZING FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, 1880–1915 (2013); TOMIKO BROWN-NAGIN, COURAGE TO DISSENT:
ATLANTA AND THE LONG HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2011).
441
WEINRIB, supra note 263; SCHILLER, supra note 47; SOPHIA Z. LEE, THE WORKPLACE CONSTITUTION:
FROM THE NEW DEAL TO THE NEW RIGHT (2014); FRYMER, supra note 46.
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of the mechanism by which mobilization or movements change law,442 but also
how law changes movements.
Labor lawyers played the same role as other social movement lawyers when
they were advocates in litigation and legislative campaigns to establish new
workplace rights. Many unions provided crucial financial support for Southern
civil rights activism in the 1960s,443 fought hard for the enactment and
enforcement of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970,444 litigated and
lobbied for legislation prohibiting employment discrimination,445 sought
enactment of state agricultural and public sector labor relations acts, and fought
for periodic increases to the minimum wage written into the FLSA446—and to
win new rights in litigation (especially pay equity).
But alongside those affirmative campaigns for law, there was the constant
threat of legal liability under the Taft-Hartley Act. The professional culture of
union lawyers involves a great deal of work for movement activists on the
defense, especially after the Taft-Hartley Act prohibited picketing and other
tactics to promote solidarity, and created a federal claim for damages.447 The
fact that labor unions were large institutions—with millions of members,
thousands of contracts to negotiate and enforce, and a welter of contractual and
statutory responsibilities to workers and employers—fundamentally shaped the
role of the union lawyer. The institutional aspect of labor unions gave lawyers
442
Compare MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004), and TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS (1988) (documenting
the role of civil rights lawyers in eliminating legally mandated segregation), with SOUTHWORTH, supra note 158;
Ann Southworth, Elements of the Support Structure for Campaign Finance Litigation in the Roberts Court, 43
L. & SOC. INQUIRY 319 (2018) (documenting the role of a network of lawyers in achieving various legal changes
sought by business, the Christian right, and various conservative groups).
443
The United Auto Workers (UAW) is well-known for its financial and political support of the civil rights
movement. Less well-known is that its general counsel, Joseph Rauh, arranged for the loan of UAW money to
bail out civil rights protesters in the early 1960s, and had the unenviable task of trying to collect the money from
activists whose charges were dismissed so it could be returned to the union treasury. See MICHAEL E. PARRISH,
CITIZEN RAUH: AN AMERICAN LIBERAL’S LIFE IN LAW AND POLITICS (2011); Papers of Joseph L. Rauh Papers
(1999) (on file with the Library of Congress, Joseph L. Rauh Papers, Box 97).
444
Occupational Safety and Health Act, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590.
445
The UAW was a major advocate for enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See, e.g., PARRISH,
supra note 443, at 159–74 (describing the efforts of Joseph Rauh, lawyer for the UAW, in pushing for civil rights
legislation in the early 1960s). The AFL-CIO filed party or amicus briefs in all the major employment
discrimination cases since the 1970s, and its lawyers were involved in drafting the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act (PDA). See Discrimination on the Basis of Pregnancy, Hearings Before the Sen. Subcomm. on Labor of the
Comm. on Human Res., 95th Cong. 199–205 (1977) (statement of Laurence Gold, Special Counsel, AFL-CIO);
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Title VII’s Statutory History and the Sex Discrimination Argument for LGBT
Workplace Protections, 127 YALE L.J. 322, 362 n.151 (2017) (describing Marsha Berzon as “the PDA drafter”).
446
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060.
447
29 U.S.C. §§ 141–197.
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an institutional role: advising a client about compliance with complex
contractual responsibilities and, importantly, protecting the institutional coffers
from legal attacks. The Juneau Spruce struggle drove home to labor lawyers
how high the stakes were for lawyers advising union clients.
For labor unions, with the brief exception of the 1930s, law has been
something to avoid as often as something to pursue. Moreover, as Part II shows,
the Taft-Hartley Act consolidated the institutional nature of unions and
leveraged it to restrict what business considered unbridled, destructive
movement activism. Labor lawyers since 1947 have occupied a difficult position
in navigating between law that allows little room for direct action and clients
who believe that direct action is the only way to build worker power. Explaining
the effect of law on the labor movement, Lee Pressman, the General Counsel of
the CIO from 1936 to 1948, sarcastically described a “gimmick” of the TaftHartley Act that had received “little notice yet has had a terrific impact on
unions.”448 This was a provision partially repealing the Norris-LaGuardia Act’s
protection against holding unions liable for the acts of organizers. Noting that
since 1947 there had “been many occasions in which unions have been held
liable for the acts of individual members on the picket line,” Pressman said that
allowing such suits was “one of the most deadly provisions of the Taft-Hartley
Act.”449 The Juneau Spruce struggle shows why. In today’s terms, union lawyers
after 1947 had an important and unwelcome compliance role that was more
similar to that of corporate lawyers than movement lawyers today.
Labor lawyers feared the restrictions and the damages liabilities, but also
worried that the law would make unions overly reliant on lawyers. Mathew
Tobriner, a California labor lawyer who later became a respected California
Supreme Court justice, predicted that “[t]he true beneficiaries [of the TaftHartley Act] will be the lawyers, who will reap a fine harvest from this paradise
of litigation.”450 Not only would member dues have to be diverted to pay legal
fees rather than to support organizing, but lawyers would become essential to
the labor movement’s strategic thinking.
The questions for unions were no longer just about when and how to strike,
boycott, or picket to build worker power, and how to avoid local police and state
tort liability when engaging in movement activism. Rather, the questions
became: Will a court find a strike illegal? What damages liability do we face if
448
449
450

omitted).

THE REMINISCENCES OF LEE PRESSMAN: ORAL HISTORY 286–87 (1958).
Id.
New Law Is Called Lawyer’s Paradise, CONTRA COSTA CNTY. LAB. J. (1947) (internal quotations
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a court decides it’s illegal? The world that labor unions occupied became,
suddenly, much more “law-thick,” which made it more important than before to
get legal advice before acting.451 And lawyers for unions had more reasons to
advise against numerous tactics.
Having to say no—as when the International wired Local 16 raising doubts
about the legality of the picketing to protest Juneau Spruce’s abrogation of the
contract—ran against the grain for lawyers like Gladstein, Andersen, and
Leonard, who became labor lawyers because they wanted to fight for working
people.452 Although their courtroom work in Juneau Spruce was relatively
conventional, Gladstein’s courtroom work in a Smith Act case during the same
years was so rebellious,453 so radical,454 that it landed him in prison for six
months for contempt of court.455 These were not lawyers who believed that they
must be independent of or dominate their clients, or who were captivated by the
“myth of rights,” as critics of lawyer-led social movements sometimes lament.
Nor were they the type of labor lawyer who transformed radical and visionary
worker demands into prosaic and modest claims that fit within existing law.456
Rather, these were lawyers who were devoted to the cause, deeply connected to
it, and committed to allowing the client’s priorities and values guide the
representation, and who wanted to defer to client goals and strategic choices.457

451
Gillian K. Hadfield & Jamie Heine, Life in a Law-Thick World: The Legal Resource Landscape for
Ordinary Americans, in BEYOND ELITE LAW: ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN AMERICA 21 (Samuel Estreicher & Joy
Radice eds., 2016).
452
Cf. Bell, Jr., supra note 159, at 490.
453
See, e.g., GERALD P. LOPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO’S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE LAW
PRACTICE (1992).
454
See, e.g., Peter Gabel & Paul Harris, Building Power and Breaking Images: Critical Legal Theory and
the Practice of Law, 11 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 369 (1982); Victor Rabinowitz, The Radical Tradition
in the Law, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 310–18 (David Kairys ed., 1990).
455
BELKNAP, supra note 309, at 112.
456
James Gray Pope, Labor’s Constitution of Freedom, 106 YALE L.J. 941, 942–43, 1012–22 (1997)
(recounting how, while workers asserted that the right to strike was protected by the Thirteenth Amendment,
their lawyers undermined the movement’s “constitutional insurgency” by presenting the workers’ demands as a
less radical First Amendment free speech right rather than the radical anti-slavery right the workers sought).
457
Compare Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the
Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 45 (1990) (describing lawyers who do not adhere to client priorities),
with Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client Narrative, 100 YALE
L.J. 2107, 2111 (1991) (describing lawyers who recount client narratives), Ann Southworth, Lawyer-Client
Decisionmaking in Civil Rights and Poverty Practice: An Empirical Study of Lawyers’ Norms, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 1101, 1120–22 (1996), and Ann Southworth, Business Planning for the Destitute? Lawyers as
Facilitators in Civil Rights and Poverty Practice, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 1121, 1142 (1996). These lawyers were
thus more like those that McCann and Silverstein described in their work on the pay equity campaign. See
McCann & Silverstein, supra note 153.
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The Juneau Spruce episode complicates existing notions of what it means to
be a cause lawyer because it highlights the fact that repressive law, not just
lawyers’ legal training or lack of imagination, can make lawyers the conduit that
channels activism. The lawyers’ new and unwelcome role of having to be cops
as well as counsel458 is also a function of the movement’s institutional power
and obligations.
4. Losing Through Losing
Scholars of law and social movements have theorized a number of
counterintuitive ways in which winning in litigation can produce a social
movement loss459 and losing can produce a social movement win.460 Among the
most enduring arguments in support of the “winning through losing” thesis is
that a litigation loss can help social movement mobilization “by inspiring
outrage and signaling the need for continued activism in light of courts’ failure
to act” and by inducing movements “to appeal to the public by encouraging
citizens to rein in an ‘activist,’ countermajoritarian judiciary.”461 Here, the
constitutive effects of law are seen to outweigh its material effects; a formal legal
outcome matters less than how it can be used to spur mobilization.
To some extent, the Juneau Spruce saga exemplifies labor’s attempt to
transform a legal loss into a movement win. Labor responded to the devastating
judgment and the Supreme Court’s cavalier opinion upholding it by using the
case as a call to arms for the repeal of Taft-Hartley.462 In Hawai’i, the ILWU
portrayed the debt collection efforts as an assault on the union, which tens of
thousands of Hawai’ian workers had struggled for decades to establish.463 Later,
they celebrated their success in outwitting both Juneau Spruce and the Big Five
by using money from the latter to pay off the former.464 The union’s leaders
emphasized that through solidarity, they could overcome any attack.
But the notion that litigation loss often produces positive movement effects
is more compelling for social movement organizations that are on the offensive,
seeking to establish new rights—as in NeJaime’s examples of LGBTQ activists
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and the Christian Right.465 By mid-century, however, the labor movement was
not focused on winning through litigation, or even through legislation. After the
Supreme Court upheld the Wagner Act in 1937466 and Congress legislated
minimum labor standards in 1938 that set the floor for collective bargaining,467
labor had won all the victories from the state that it would get for decades. The
Juneau Spruce mess was a reminder of what unions had discovered in fending
off injunctions and damages suits since the nineteenth century—litigation was
largely to be avoided, because courts were not a forum in which labor could
expect to gain power, or even any rights that courts and employers would
respect. And any losses they endured always had the potential to put at risk all
that labor had won thus far.
A litigation loss as momentous as the damages judgment in Juneau Spruce
had material consequences that could not be “spun” away. Had the union’s
lawyers not proven so strategic, the loss could have been the end of the union.
But even though the union survived to fight another day, the case required union
leaders and lawyers to expend resources devising clever ways to evade paying
the judgment. Those resources—once again, every penny of which was from
member dues—could have been spent fighting for better working conditions or
organizing more workers. In the long term, the precedent it set taught union
leadership to be much more careful of how they allowed International staff to
support activism by locals, what they allowed to be said in the union newspaper,
whether they would picket to protest employer abrogation of contracts, and
whether or when the union would engage in secondary boycott activity in
support of other workers.
This is not to say that the ILWU became quiescent and never engaged in
secondary boycotts or picketing; it still did, and it still does.468 And union
lawyers with whom we have recently discussed this case insist that they do not
tell the leadership or members not to be activists, but instead counsel them how
to be activists in lawful ways. But none denies that the law has made it much
harder for labor to engage in movement activism. It was the legacy of Juneau
Spruce (if not the specific case) that prompted AFL-CIO President Lane
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Kirkland to lament in 1989 that labor would be better off if the entire NLRA, as
amended, were repealed and labor went back to the “law of the jungle.”469
Because of advances in law and social movements theory over the past
several decades, it is no longer possible to deny the law’s powerful constitutive
effects. As scholars continue the project of bringing more movements under
study, we will see when the constitutive effects outweigh the instrumental effects
of law, and when they do not. Bringing labor back into the conversation suggests
caution in de-emphasizing the materiality of law. Whether it is the ILWU’s
struggles against Juneau Spruce, low-wage workers fired for organizing against
the threat of COVID-19,470 or immigrants arrested by Immigration and Customs
Enforcement for protesting their mistreatment,471 there are limits to the ability
of even the most robust belief in legal rights to resist the power of statesanctioned repression backed by the force of law.
5. Differentiated Rights
Within law and social movements scholarship, debates about the value of
rights talk have, at times, been divorced from both doctrine and legal discourse.
The Juneau Spruce case—and the case of labor more generally—reemphasizes
that not all social harms are equally cognizable as rights, whether in courts of
law or public opinion.
Labor’s experience with law has often been one of courts prioritizing
employer property rights. Like many cases, Juneau Spruce involved competing
rights claims.472 The Local sought to exercise rights to association and
expression: to protest their employer’s abrogation of their labor contract and
violation of its statutory obligations to bargain in good faith, and to encourage
others to take action in concert with them.473 Juneau Spruce, on the other hand,
sought to exercise a right to use its property to further its business interests
without interference.474 In resolving these competing claims, the courts read the
469
Martin Tolchin, A.F.L.-C.I.O. Chief Laments State of Labor Laws, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 30, 1989),
https://www.nytimes.com/1989/08/30/us/afl-cio-chief-laments-state-of-labor-laws.html.
470
Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Rachel Abrams, Fired in a Pandemic ‘Because We Tried to Start a Union,’
Workers Say, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/28/business/coronavirus-unionslayoffs.html.
471
Marissa J. Lang, Immigration Judge Revokes Green Card, Orders Deportation of Virginia Activist
Alejandra Pablos, WASH. POST (Dec. 12, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/immigration/federaljudge-revokes-green-card-orders-deportation-of-virginia-activist-alejandra-pablos/2018/12/12/fac5f3ea-fe4011e8-862a-b6a6f3ce8199_story.html.
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Id. at 238.
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Taft-Hartley Act to prioritize business rights to uninterrupted operation over
labor associational and expression rights.475 The Court held the union liable for
actions that, if done today by any group other than a labor union, would be
protected by the First Amendment.476 For the act of walking with signs outside
of a lumber mill—using nothing but their physical presence and the written and
spoken word—the union was held liable for damages in an amount to force it
out of existence.
This is not only about distinct types of rights, but also about whose claim to
a certain type of right is more convincing. Over the multi-year legal battle to
enforce the judgment, courts consistently prioritized Juneau Spruce’s claims
over competing claims from ILWU-affiliated unions. Across jurisdictions, a
variety of courts were willing to reach into the bank accounts of entities that
were legally independent from the defendants actually found liable in the case,
in order to ensure that Juneau Spruce’s judgment was satisfied.
Bringing labor back into law and social movements studies helps complicate
existing theories about the limits or promise of rights, including rights talk, as
an undifferentiated category. As we know, certain grievances are more easily
translated into rights language than others. Claims to social and economic rights
largely lack the resonance of other rights claims, including the equality claims
which have been central to more recent rights-based movements. As Sandra
Levitsky has shown, given the minimal U.S. welfare state, many people continue
to understand rights as “limited only to certain kinds of civil and political
rights.”477 Without a “widely available discourse” of socio-economic rights,
those who struggle without government support for their daily socio-economic
needs often “fundamentally [do] not understand how to apply the concept of
rights to their circumstances.”478
Labor has often eschewed rights invocations because labor’s goals do not fit
neatly into existing discourse or constitutional doctrine.479 As Kate Andrias
475

Id. at 244–45.
See Catherine L. Fisk, A Progressive Labor Vision of the First Amendment: Past as Prologue, 118
COLUM. L. REV. 2057 (2018).
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Entitlements, 42 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 551, 576 (2008).
478
Id. at 566, 576.
479
Andrias sees labor’s demands as being “more incompatible with court adjudication than the individual
rights claims of recent identity-based movements, or even than revived efforts to win constitutional rights for
the indigent.” Andrias, supra note 196, at 1614. She attributes the incompatibility to the fact that the goal of
labor law and the labor movement “is not only to guarantee individual rights or to secure freedom for workers
from abuses of employer power, but also to enable workers to participate in the formation of conditions that
structure their lives.” Id.
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points out, while “there is a developed line of constitutional law doctrine that
tackles problems of discrimination, at least in the public sector,” a credible
theory of constitutional support for “minimum entitlements and collective labor
rights” remains weak.480 There are currently no constitutional rights to minimum
labor standards, to co-determine conditions of work, or to use direct action,
including strikes, to secure minimum standards. Indeed, says Andrias, “courtdefined rights, as they exist in the modern American tradition, are in substantial
tension with the commitments and goals of the labor movement.”481
This disparity among movements in the work that rights do is evident in
classic works on social movements. McCann’s pathbreaking defense of rights
was based on his empirical finding that union litigation challenging the gendered
pay gap in the 1980s and 1990s contributed to movement-building and
consciousness-raising, even when the litigation failed.482 Now, twenty-five years
after the publication of the book, however, it is clear that this momentum
translated into long-term gains solely on the issue of pay equity. In the early
1980s, women made approximately 62% of what men made; in 2018, they made
85% of what men made.483 But this consciousness-raising did not build the labor
movement. In the early 1980s, 20% of the United States workforce were union
members.484 Today, in sharp contrast to the progress achieved on pay equity,
union density has been halved.485 As Nelson Lichtenstein has observed,
“American unions have been unable to make the rights revolution work for
them. . . . [F]or most of U.S. labor, especially that centered in the private sector,
rights consciousness, which has revolutionized race and gender relations, has
had little organizational payoff.”486
By arguing that certain rights claims have greater discursive legitimacy than
others, we do not mean to disagree with scholars who have argued that the
United States Constitution can be interpreted to have much more to say about
material inequality and distributive justice than is commonly presumed.487 The
past decade has seen a blossoming of scholarship that reconstructs paths not

480

Id. at 1597 n.34.
Id. at 1598, 1612.
482
MCCANN, supra note 25, at 278–84.
483
See, e.g., Nikki Graf, Anna Brown & Eileen Patten, The Narrowing, But Persistent, Gender Gap in
Pay, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Mar. 22, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2019/03/22/gender-pay-gapfacts/.
484
MAYER, supra note 39, at 22.
485
See News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Labor: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Members — 2019, at 1 (Jan.
22, 2020), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf.
486
NELSON LICHTENSTEIN, A CONTEST OF IDEAS: CAPITAL, POLITICS, AND LABOR 151 (2013).
487
See, e.g., Lynd, supra note 89, at 1440.
481

FISKREDDYPROOFS_9.30.20

2020]

9/30/2020 12:01 PM

PROTECTION BY LAW, REPRESSION BY LAW

137

taken in defining the scope of U.S. constitutional concerns.488 Courts in the
1940s understood collective labor rights to association and protest to be a central
First Amendment concern.489 Civil rights attorneys argued that the Thirteenth
Amendment imposed affirmative duties on the government to address economic
exploitation as well as racial discrimination.490 The story of how these
distributive concerns were ultimately read out of constitutional canon following
World War II is a long and complex one, but the point these scholars make is
that other readings of the Constitution are possible.491
Still, the foundational work of building a discourse of constitutionally
protected social and economic rights is, at best, a work in progress. Whatever
progressive legal scholars and labor unions may imagine for the future of the
First Amendment, a majority of the Supreme Court—for now—contends that
only public sector labor law—not the Bill of Rights—gives employees the right
to collectively bargain, and that right is more vulnerable than ever. The work of
building a constitutional theory that would, for instance, regulate “private”
economic coercion or guarantee a living wage is, as yet, even more embryonic.
Within this context, and consistent with the experience of the ILWU in Juneau
Spruce, it is clear that rights are not an undifferentiated category.
B. Toward a Theory of the Changing Role of Law and Lawyers Through
Cycles of Protest
As we noted at the outset, our goal in this Article is to ask the question—
what do we get when we bring labor back into the fold of law and social
movement scholarship? Refocusing on labor complicates existing conversations
in the field. But we think it may do something more. By emphasizing the
differences over time in how movements have experienced law—by suggesting
that the relationship between law and movements is socio-historically specific—
it invites greater attention to how and why movements’ relationship with law
shifts over time.

488
See, e.g., Joseph R. Fishkin & William Forbath, Reclaiming Constitutional Political Economy: An
Introduction to the Symposium on the Constitution and Economic Inequality, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1287, 1289 (2016);
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Fisk, supra note 476, at 2067.
490
See Jamal Greene, Thirteenth Amendment Optimism, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1733 (2012).
491
See generally Fishkin & Forbath, supra note 488 (describing the process by which affirmative rights
to economic and political equality were read out of the constitution and proposing how they might be read back
in). On how distributive concerns lost traction in the civil rights movement’s litigation agenda, see GOLUBOFF,
supra note 110, at 141–73.
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We turn in this section to a tentative theoretical outline of what a sociohistorical approach to the study of law and social movements might look like.492
And we conclude with thoughts about how this kind of approach might
illuminate the relationship between the labor movement and the rights-based
movements which succeeded it.
Much law and social movements scholarship has focused on only one
movement at a time. Doing so is important; it enables a deep look that would not
be possible with a comparative or broadly contextualized study. Yet, it is also
important to consider the mutually constitutive relationships between law and
movements. By examining the ways in which one movement’s experience with
law shapes other movements’ experience with law over time we are better able
to generalize about law and social movements, plural.
Two key principles would animate a socio-historical approach to the study
of law and social movements. First, it would emphasize the relationship between
movements in and over time. As political scientist Sidney Tarrow has argued,
movements tend to arise within “cycles of protest.”493 These are periods—the
present moment appears to be one—of massive social upheaval. Because of a
particular confluence of events, one movement rises up and succeeds. Its success
signals “the vulnerability of the state to collective action,” and ushers in
conditions under which other movements rise up as well.494 Situating
movements in these cycles reminds us that “[t]he most fundamental fact about
collective action is its connectedness, both historically and spatially, both with
other instances of collective action of a similar kind, and with the actions of
different claim-makers such as authorities and countermovements.”495
492
This approach builds upon Charles Tilly’s and Sidney Tarrow’s work in theorizing “repertoires of
contention” and “cycles of protest,” respectively. Charles Tilly, Repertoires of Contention in America and
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Because of this connectedness, one movement may empower others, but it
may constrain or weaken them as well. How early movements within a protest
cycle frame their grievances can become a “master frame,” an almost hegemonic
way of representing movement claims.496 This frame serves as “a kind of master
algorithm” which “colors and constrains the orientations and activities of other
movements.”497 Similarly, the organizational forms and strategies of early
movements in a cycle often become the models for later movements. Thus, the
tactical repertoire of early movements also tends to “color and constrain” the
toolkits of later movements.498
Second, a socio-historical approach to law and social movements would
emphasize the dialectical relationship between social movements and law. The
ways in which social movements engage with law are shaped by the legal
possibilities available to them, and these legal possibilities are in turn shaped by
social movement action. As Ellen Ann Andersen puts it in her examination of
the role of “legal opportunity structures” in gay rights litigation in the United
States, “socio-legal structures shape movement strategies and are shaped by
those strategies in turn.”499 Like the common law, one movement’s legal
outcome is reincorporated into the legal regime in which other movements
navigate. As Serena Mayeri has shown, law particularly encourages analogical
reasoning about unfair treatment, as each new group seizes upon legal precedent
and seeks to apply that precedent to its own case.500 Either a success or a loss
fundamentally reshapes the tactical choices available to all movements.
Taken together, these two principles mean that when movements engage
with the legal system, they are, in part, engaging with the legacies of previous
movement actors. The “rights” available to movements are, as Bartholomew and
Hunt put it, “the crystallization of past struggles and the resulting balances of
forces or power, which are thereby legitimated.”501 Born of a particular socio-
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historical juncture and its particular compromises, such rights “play a role in
constituting the terrain for subsequent social action and interaction.”502
C. The Legal Reification of Movements
The socio-historic approach to law and social movements that we have
sketched above begins to bridge the conceptual gap between labor and the more
recent rights-based social movements, to see how law has played a role, among
other factors, in constructing them as separate and apart from each other. In so
doing, this approach allows for a more systematic analysis of how law shaped
social movement activity, and social movement activity shaped law, throughout
the twentieth century.
With its remarkable victory in Brown v. Board of Education, the civil rights
movement launched a new cycle of protest, which lasted well into the 1970s,
and whose legacy continues to shape movements today.503 As the progenitor of
the cycle, the civil rights movement empowered and constrained other
movements. The women’s, disability, and LGBTQ rights movements—along
with others—are commonly seen as drawing from the civil rights master frame
and from its socio-legal tactical toolkit.504 They sought to accomplish social
change through claims-making on behalf of minority groups.505 Their charge
was at times led by legal advocacy organizations with lawyers at the helm. And
they invoked rights language which accomplished significant constitutive
change, even if material change was not always forthcoming.506 In other words,
they were empowered and constrained by the same model of social movement
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that has at times dominated the socio-legal imaginary and law and social
movements scholarship.
The distinctive characteristics of the civil rights movement and its approach
to law were not constructed in a vacuum, however. They evolved over more than
a century of struggle on multiple fronts. When W.E.B. DuBois wrote his classic
1935 book on Reconstruction, in the midst of the great labor upheavals of the
1930s, he deliberately characterized the activism of enslaved people in bringing
about the end of slavery as a “general strike” that targeted slavery as an
economic institution.507 Similarly, later historians of Reconstruction have
theorized Black people as workers engaged in struggle with employers.508
According to historian Paul Lawrie, the so-called “Labor” and “Negro”
problems of the late 1800s and early 1900s were actually deeply interconnected,
linked by the “sociocultural demands of contemporary labor economy.”509
DuBois and others have rightly emphasized the role of racism by white
workers and their unions in the divergence of labor and civil rights after the Civil
War.510 Law, however, helped reify this divergence, increasingly channeling
these interconnected issues into discrete regulatory regimes. One of the biggest
limitations of the NLRA, as enacted, was its racialized and gendered
exclusions.511 Through the purposeful exclusion of agricultural, domestic, and
public sector workers, the demographics of the workers for whom unionization
was legally accessible remained for decades, by law, whiter and more male than
the entire working class.512 Moreover, through the legal requirement that unions
be supported by a majority of workers in a bargaining unit, the law created
further opportunities for employers to forestall unionization by appealing to

507
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racial divisions, and for white workers to prevent Black workers from centering
issues of discrimination in the workplace through labor unions.513
The Taft-Hartley Act went one step further, limiting the scope of legitimate
union activity, as opportunities for solidaristic struggle between labor unions and
civil rights groups seemed increasingly possible. First, by the early 1950s, the
Taft-Hartley Act’s anti-Communist requirement had forced labor unions to
purge their leadership of activists most committed to racial justice.514 Second,
Taft-Hartley and a number of restrictive court and agency decisions prohibited
the kinds of direct action (especially sit-down strikes and secondary protests)
which had created the New Deal.515 Juneau Spruce drove home that running
afoul of these prohibitions meant risking everything labor had already won.
Third, after the Supreme Court ruled in 1950 that civil rights picketing urging a
consumer boycott of a grocery store that refused to hire Black clerks could be
enjoined because it, like labor picketing, was economic coercion not
constitutionally protected political speech,516 civil rights activists had good
reason to frame their protests as seeking political and social transformation—
voting, education, access to places of public accommodation—rather than as a
strike over working conditions. If a labor union had been prominently involved,
sector-wide picketing or boycotts would have been subject to injunctions and,
as in Juneau Spruce, crushing damages liability. If a union was not at the
forefront, social movement actors could and did successfully argue that their
protest was “political” and protected by the First Amendment. For all these
reasons, when the civil rights movement entered its direct action phase with the
lunch counter sit-ins in 1960, their lawyers’ best hope for securing legal
protection was to distance the movement’s activism from the labor picketing and
sit-downs that came before, and to emphasize the political and social aspects of
the protests, rather than the economic.517
The extraordinary repression faced by majoritarian, multiracial, radical labor
unions between 1947 and 1955 had long-term impact for both the labor and the
civil rights movements.518 By furthering the divide between labor and civil
513
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rights, law weakened both. According to Robert Korstad and Nelson
Lichtenstein, the repression of union workers’ civil rights activism in the 1940s
resulted in the civil rights struggle of the 1960s having a different social
character and a different political agenda than it might otherwise have had.519
The crushing of the incipient efforts of unions to organize—in the South, in
agriculture, in nonwhite communities—left unions weaker.520 The repression of
radical intersectional unionism empowered those factions in the labor movement
who were not committed to racial equality and left the civil rights and women’s
movements cut off from the workplace as a way to build an inclusive structure
of economic equity.
While bearing in mind labor’s affirmative contribution to this divide,521 it is
worth considering what the labor and civil rights movements might have been
like had the Taft-Hartley Act not derailed Operation Dixie, the CIO Southern
organizing effort of 1946 to 1953.522 Unions recognized from the moment they
began unionizing industry in the North and Midwest that the gains workers made
would hasten business efforts to find lower-wage and more exploitable labor in
the South.523 Therefore, as soon as World War II ended, the CIO launched
Operation Dixie, a massive effort to organize textile and other industries in the
South on a racially inclusive, industrial basis.524 Communist unionists’ staunch
anti-racism and determination to organize the South provided even more reasons
for business leaders to use the Taft-Hartley Act’s anti-Communist oath provision
to drive them out of the unions.525 Had more people of color succeeded in their
quest to form and join labor unions at this time, the divide between “labor” and
“civil rights” would not have been as large. That, in turn, might have reduced
the ability of economic elites to perpetuate their centuries-long strategy of
dividing the working class on the basis of race. It might have provided the
institutional basis to create a federal labor agency that treated labor rights and
employment discrimination rights together rather than separately, which
scholars have shown weakened the NLRB, the Equal Employment Opportunity
519
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Commission, and state fair employment practices agencies, and also weakened
the worker protections that these agencies enforce.526 And it would have
provided the civil rights movement with a strong institutional footing and a focus
on workplace and economic equity.
The history of the women’s movement between 1940 and 1980 similarly
reveals that unions provided a fertile environment in which working-class
women organized and developed a vision of feminism that focused on economic
equity for working women, especially women of color and women who were the
primary breadwinners for their family. This vision differed significantly from
the middle class maternalistic or social issue-oriented liberationist visions of
feminism which came to dominate the headlines.527 As Cobble shows, the labor
movement of the 1940s “spurred feminism in much the same way as did the civil
rights movement or the 1960s New Left organizations, albeit for a different
group of women.”528 Again, the decline of the CIO unions that provided a base
for Black, Latina, and working-class white women deprived the women’s
movement of the 1980s and later of a strong foundation in the experiences of
working women of color.
Just as organized labor’s experience with law affected the form and
trajectory of the civil rights movement and the feminist movement, the civil
rights movement’s experience with law would alter the trajectory of labor too.
When social movements inscribe their particularized, compromised, and sociohistorically specific vision of justice in the law, those changes become part of
the governing order. When the limitations of that new order ultimately become
apparent, they are subject to challenge by new movements, who will, to some
extent, dismantle the work of previous challengers in inscribing their own vision.
Organized labor, which arose in an earlier cycle of protest with distinct
frames, organizational forms, tactics, and legal claims, did not fare as well in the
cycle of protest initiated by the civil rights movement. As noted above, cycles
of protest are not simply generative; they are destructive.529 The demise of
movements “can also be explained in part by the emergence of frames that
challenge or compete with the movement’s master frame.”530 Organized labor’s
defining frame has always been solidarity, and its primary tactic has been to
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build power through private, worker-run institutions. The rights-based
movements of the latter half of the twentieth century directly called into question
the concept of labor solidarity, highlighting the exclusions on which it had been
built. And their emphasis on building public law as a mechanism of social justice
similarly tended to delegitimize the privatized welfare state that had been labor’s
infrastructure.
The Supreme Court issued its Juneau Spruce decision in 1952, just two years
before Brown.531 Decided as one cycle of protest waxed and another waned, the
case reflects both how the law came to channel labor activism into particularly
narrow pathways, and to treat it differently than other social movements.
To the first point, Juneau Spruce is a concrete example of how the TaftHartley Act weakened labor as a broad, class-based movement. Taft-Hartley has
long been understood by scholars as having been intended to drive apart groups
within the dominant social movements of the mid-century.532 The antiCommunist oath provision was to push Communists out of the labor movement,
inserting a wedge between radicals and liberals.533 That, in turn, would weaken
the connections between labor and civil rights activists, weaken labor’s drive
into the South, and slow the drive for racial equality that Communists and
radicals were deeply committed to advancing.534 As applied in Juneau Spruce,
the restrictions on direct action weakened industrial unionism and sectoral
bargaining by allowing the employer to ignore the CIO’s own resolution of the
dispute between the ILWU and the IWA.535 This contributed to splintering labor
as a movement into groups divided by skill, trade, race, gender, region, and
occupation.
The ILWU was one of the few unions that succeeded in organizing, and in
making its organizing gains stick (at least for a time), across the boundaries of
race, occupation, and even sectorperhaps more even than the industrial unions
in auto, steel, mining, and meatpacking, which were the bulwarks of the CIO.536
That the company’s lawyers chose to attack Hawai’i Local 142 in its judgment
collection efforts (more, as far as the historical record reveals, than any other
local except Local 16, which had picketed) is not merely because it was huge
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Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding de jure racial segregation in public schools
unconstitutional).
532
See e.g., ZIEGER, supra note 199, at 250–52.
533
Id. at 247, 251, 279.
534
Id.
535
See supra Part II.B.
536
ZIEGER, supra note 199, at 2, 154.

FISKREDDYPROOFS_9.30.20

146

9/30/2020 12:01 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 70:63

and therefore had more dues-paying members to provide funds to pay the
judgment.537 Its multiracial, sectoral, multi-occupational, and state-wide
membership was a radical departure from the norm for unions of the era and was
a threat to the political and economic power of the white elites in Hawai’i.538
When the litigation established the principles that solidarity across a union could
be punished by damages, that the CIO’s resolution of the jurisdictional dispute
was not binding on anyone (including one of the unions that participated in the
dispute resolution process), and that one union could be forced to pay damages
for picketing done by another, the law created very strong incentives for unions
to eschew the kind of cross-sectoral activism which was the goal of the ILWU
in the 1940s.
The business elite’s divide and conquer strategy was achieved by bans on
picketing, especially for purposes of organization, recognition, or jurisdictional
protest, and by bans on secondary appeals to workers and consumers.539 These
legal prohibitions were precisely tailored to weaken labor as a force for solidarity
across occupations, workplaces, and between consumers and workers.540 The
introduction of courts into the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements,
the provisions allowing unions to be sued in federal court, and the NLRB’s
authority over bargaining unit determinations and the provisions forbidding
jurisdictional strikes were to force union leaders to be “responsible,” to pursue
narrower goals of narrower segments of workers through bargaining rather than
through direct action.541 Finally, the restrictions on union political
expenditures—which were among the first campaign finance limitations in
federal law, and preceded by decades any comparable restrictions on corporate
expenditures—were intended to weaken unions as political actors and thereby
blunt the effectiveness of national, class-based activism.542
To the second point, Juneau Spruce was possible only because of the Court’s
increasing reluctance to conceptualize labor as a social movement. When the
Supreme Court rejected free speech challenges to Taft-Hartley Act’s restrictions
on protest in the same years as the Juneau Spruce litigation, it emphasized union
protests as being animated by the economic self-interest of workers.543 The
537
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Court abandoned the view it had taken in Thornhill v. Alabama in 1940, when it
accorded First Amendment protection to labor picketing because “[t]he health
of the present generation and of those as yet unborn may depend on” the ability
of workers to protest, and “[f]ree discussion concerning the conditions in
industry and the causes of labor disputes appears to us indispensable to the
effective and intelligent use of the processes of popular government to shape the
destiny of modern industrial society.”544 Rather, in Juneau Spruce and in cases
decided around the same time, the Court characterized labor issues as economic,
not political, and labor’s interests as being narrowly limited to the wealth of the
picketers rather than the welfare of society at large.545
But this happened just as the Montgomery Bus Boycott ignited the fuse of
social movement activism that exploded during the direct-action phase of the
civil rights movement.546 By the time the sit-in cases had reached the Court just
a decade after Juneau Spruce, protests about equitable access to places of public
accommodation and to jobs free from discrimination were characterized as
political, and in pursuit of the public interest, rather than narrow self-interest.547
Thus, the Court said, in according First Amendment protection to the Freedom
Summer-era boycott of white-owned businesses in Mississippi, civil rights
boycotts, unlike labor boycotts, “sought no special advantage for themselves.”548
Juneau Spruce is thus one important and largely unknown chapter in the
larger process by which workers, acting through unions, became ever more
constrained in their ability to engage in the quintessential social movement
activity of using protest to exert social and economic power. It was part of a
series of cases in which the Supreme Court read federal law to broadly restrict
union protests and rejected First Amendment claims for labor protest.549 And
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that exclusion matters when the price of unprotected activism was as great as the
ILWU found it in the 1950s, and as it is now.
D. The Future of Labor as a Social Movement
This Article has focused on the relationship between law and organized labor
in one primary incarnation—labor unions regulated by law. By granting rights
to this particular organizational form, unions qua collective bargaining agents
became the dominant way through which workers could and would seek
collective advancement for decades—even as the law changed to impose more
costs and fewer benefits.
As union density continues its decades-long decline and labor law becomes
ever more incompatible with economic realities, the future of that form of
organized labor is uncertain. Consistent with the dynamic interplay between law
and movements, new forms of organized labor emerge in its wake: workers’
centers and other “alt-labor” organizations. We have focused less on these
alternate models in this Article—partly because they are somewhat easier to
conceive of as social movement actors, and have been named and analyzed as
such in the legal literature.550
And yet, it is precisely the “tangle of incentives” created by labor law that
forces this distinction, between “social movement organization” on the one
hand, and “labor union” on the other. Workers centers insist that they are not
labor unions largely because doing so frees them from the specter of Juneau
Spruce-like liability; federal injunctions under section 8(b)(4) and damages
judgments under section 303 are available only against “labor unions,” not social
justice organizations.551 Not being a labor union regulated by law allows
workers, particularly those excluded from the NLRA, or for whom its rigid
structure is particularly inapt, to advance their collective interests more
550
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regulated by federal labor law); César F. Rosado Marzán, Worker Centers and the Moral Economy: Disrupting
Through Brokerage, Prestige, and Moral Framing, 2017 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 409, 411 (arguing that “because
worker centers function as social movement organizations, worker centers can frame issues in ‘right’ or ‘wrong’
ways, thereby attempting to garner wide popular support to their causes”).
551
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Question, ONLABOR.ORG (June 5, 2018), https://www.onlabor.org/are-worker-centers-democratic-revisitingthe-labor-organization-question/ (discussing the debate over whether worker centers are labor organizations);
Kati L. Griffith & Leslie C. Gates, Worker Centers: Labor Policy as a Carrot, Not a Stick, 14 HARV. L. & POL’Y
REV. 231 (2019) (explaining why worker centers are not unions and should not be treated as such for purposes
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effectively. As other scholars have written, these organizations have helped recenter economic equity and workplace exploitation as social justice issues—and
class as an essential component of intersectionality. Their dynamic tactics, their
focus on the most vulnerable workers, and their insurgency make their claim to
social movement status stronger. But, for all their pathbreaking work, they also
bump up against the limitations of their structure. Like their counterparts 100
years ago, they are limited in their capacity to effect change without an ongoing
institutional role in the workplace. Again, law gives shape to social movements,
whether movements seek out the law or not.
As we contemplate the future of the labor movement, the ways in which law
has both protected and repressed workers through the regulation of labor unions
merit careful consideration. For all the weaknesses of their increasingly narrow
form, labor unions stand out, too, for their successes. As Jim Pope points out,
workers’ centers are often not funded and controlled by the workers they serve:
Alone among social movements, the labor movement has routinely
managed to create durable, democratic mass organizations that can
function both locally and nationally. The fact that unions have much
to learn from other movements, like the civil rights and the women’s
movements, should not blind us to the fact that those movements have
rarely produced such organizations—except in the form of labor
unions. This is no small matter.552

Moreover, workers’ centers do not do what unions do: organize broad
coalitions to exert collective power within workplaces.553
Even as we have argued that the labor movement has more similarities to
other social movements than has commonly been understood, it is important to
remember the ways it is distinct. Labor as the basis of an oppositional movement
represents a crucial liability of capitalism. Other movements coexist more easily
within this country’s governing economic logic, at least to some extent, whereas
the labor movement challenges the primacy of capital.554 Against all odds, labor
unions radically transformed the American political economy for decades. Their
decimation has increased economic stratification and weakened the center-left
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political coalition.555 Whatever form the future of the labor movement takes, a
massive task awaits it.
CONCLUSION
Our goal in this Article has been to expand the boundaries of what constitutes
the study of law and social movements—to include labor unions seeking
economic equity within the workplace, and their socio-historically specific
relationship with law.
To do so, we presented a case study of how the labor movement experienced
the law during the mid-twentieth century, not as a goal, tactic, or framebut as
something imposed upon it, despite labor’s best efforts to avoid it. The legal
restraints of the Taft-Hartley Act, as interpreted by courts, seized upon much of
what had been labor’s strengthsits institutional power (and its coffers), its use
of picketing to create solidarity, its legitimacy as a movement advancing the
general goodand regulated these strengths to the point of depriving them of
potency. Juneau Spruce exploited dissension within the ranks of the CIO, a
dissension that had been fanned into flames by the Taft-Hartley Act’s coercion
of unions to oust suspected Communists from their ranks. The NLRB and courts
aided that effort by ignoring the peaceful resolution of the dispute between the
two contending unions at the Juneau Spruce mill. Having thus denied labor
organizations the power to resolve the disputes, the courts then conceptualized
the economic harm that ensued as being entirely the fault of the unions. These
multifaceted legal constraints required union lawyers at every step of the process
to counsel clients to moderate, to redirect, or to cease movement activity. At the
same time, new social movements arose, which sought to avoid labor’s fate, and
in so doing, reconstituted the relationship between social movements and law.
The story of Juneau Spruce is important not just conceptually but
temporally. The early 1950s was a transition point in cycles of protestthe point
at which one vision of social movement replaced another, when one type of
regulatory regime began to regress, just as another coalesced. Looking back at
that moment in time, it is hard not to considerand perhaps mournpaths not
taken, paths that might have better reconciled these two models of social
movement. Today, we sit at what may be another historical turning point. The
past ten years can be seen as their own cycle of protesta populist challenge to
the neoliberal turn of the decades prior.556 New visions of justice contend with
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older ones: international solidarity versus national supremacy; environment
versus growth; inclusion versus exclusion. The raison d’être of
governanceand of law with itappears to be in question. And so too does the
future of the labor movement.
On the heels of two years—2018 and 2019—that saw more workers on strike
than in previous decades, the 2020 crisis of capitalism brought on by the global
coronavirus pandemic has called long overdue attention to the dearth of worker
protection and social insurance in the United States. Daily headlines question
how it came to be that so many of the workers deemed “essential” are poorly
paid, without health insurance and sick leave, and excluded from legal
protections linked to employment, because they are undocumented or
misclassified as independent contractors.557 We have shown that law played a
significant role in bringing about a world in which essential workers have so few
protections; it channeled labor from its mass movement origins in the 1930s,
into a powerful institution from the 1940s through the 1960s, to its much
weakened form today.
Envisioning there to be different models for how social movements are
organized and for how they engage with law not only helps us think through the
socio-historical specificity of the rights-oriented social movements, but also
allows for theorizing how other movements have drawn or could yet build upon
organized labor’s collective action, majoritarian, non-rights-based model. For
example, other groups (e.g., tenant unions, debtor unions, cooperatives, credit
unions, or even class actions) have created or could create institutional channels
for the ongoing exercise of collective power. In turn, those institutional channels
will both empower and repress, just as they did for labor. And, of course, our
socio-historical approach also invites creativity in thinking through new
organizational forms and new ways of interacting with law.
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In chaotic times like 2020, scholarship at the nexus of law and social
movements is more important than ever. For that scholarship to be able to
theorize these new challenges, it must be attentive to the jurisprudential
boundaries which have channeled social movement activity throughout the
twentieth century.

